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ABSTRACT 
 
In our rapidly urbanising world, the need for sustainable settlement planning, 
particularly for the poor in developing countries, is essential. In South Africa, 
apartheid spatial constructs segregated black population groups, denying them 
equal access to economic opportunities; housing; as well as basic and social 
services. After the first democratic elections in 1994, policy makers attempted to 
redress these inequalities. Though early housing policy aimed to provide secure 
tenure: permanent residential structures, and access to basic services for the poor, 
these policies failed to meet the objectives of the policy makers. In articulating that 
the state could not meet the needs of the homeless, and that housing for the poor 
should be delivered within a normalized market in order to attract private investment, 
these policies (which promoted private sector, contractor-driven development) only 
served to heighten inequalities previously entrenched by the apartheid regime.   
 
In 2004, after measuring delivery failures, policy makers empowered the state to 
become an enabler of subsidised and low-income housing delivery, rather than 
leaving housing provision solely to the market. The new policy included the use of 
multiple finance and delivery mechanisms, multiple housing typologies, and clearly 
expressed the need for capacity development. It also espoused the need for citizens 
to become participants in sustainable settlement delivery. Despite this, policy 
implementation continues to be fragmented and mostly ineffectual.   
  
Interviews, survey results and site visits reveal that there are some examples of 
integrated sustainable human settlements in the South African (SA) context. A few 
recent examples showcase better quality houses, a broader variety of housing 
options and typologies, better locations, functioning developmental relationships and 
the use of multiple financing mechanisms. Conversely, case studies and 
comparative analysis of developments reveal that most projects designated as 
Breaking New Ground (BNG) responsive by government officials (as defined in the 
study) fail to meet BNG policy objectives. This study argues that low-income housing 
provision continues to focus on the delivery of free-standing subsidy houses without 
providing a range of typologies and tenure options. It argues that basic and social-
service provision is intermittent and, at times, non-existent. It argues that current 
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funding models for the development of sustainable human settlements in low-income 
communities are unable to meet basic needs within communities. It shows that skills 
scarcities within government prevent the acceleration of housing delivery and that 
participation strategies have failed to meet the policy objective of enabling citizens to 
become participants in sustainable settlement development. 
 
In conclusion, it recommends that the current focus on and allocations of subsidies 
toward ownership models for shelter and housing delivery be re-examined. It 
suggests that support should be provided for lending institutions to extend finance to 
creditworthy, low- and middle-income families. Additionally, accredited capacity-
building programmes should be developed and funded for local authorities, enabling 
local government to be the sole driver of local development. It argues that capacity 
should be built in community organisations to speed up delivery processes, and 
recommends that provincial government’s power and authority be incrementally 
devolved to local government as capacity is increased within local authorities.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
Weens die snelle verstedeliking in Suid-Afrika het die behoefte aan beplanning van 
volhoubare nedersettings noodsaaklik geword, veral vir armes in ontwikkelende 
lande. Tydens apartheid is gesegregeerde swart gemeenskappe gelyke toegang tot 
ekonomiese geleenthede, behuising, sowel as basiese en maatskaplike dienste 
ontneem. Na 1994 het beleidmakers gepoog om hierdie ongelykhede reg te stel. 
Hoewel vroeë behuisingsbeleid daarop gemik was om permanente residensiële 
strukture wat toegang tot basiese dienste sou verseker, het hierdie beleid egter 
gefaal. Toe die staat nie sy doelwitte kon bereik nie, is daar besluit om private 
beleggings te lok. Hierdie privaatsektor gedrewe beleid, wat ontwikkeling binne 'n 
genormaliseerde mark sou bevorder, het egter slegs gedien om ongelykhede te 
verskerp. Dit is dan ook dieselfde ongelykhede wat voorheen in die apartheidsbeleid 
verskans is.  
 
In 2004, na besef is dat verskaffing misluk het, het beleidmakers die staat bemagtig 
om te verseker dat gesubsidieerde behuising vir lae-inkomste groepe verskaf word, 
eerder as om behuising slegs aan die private sektor oor te laat.  Die nuwe beleid het 
ingesluit die gebruik van verskeie finansiële en leweringsmeganismes, meervoudige 
behuising-tipologieë, en het duidelik die behoefte aan kapasiteitsontwikkeling 
vergestalt. Dit het ook die behoefte onderstreep wat daar bestaan vir landsburgers 
om deel te neem aan die proses van lewering van volhoubare nedersettings.  Ten 
spyte hiervan is min sukses behaal. 
 
Hierdie studie voer aan dat daar 'n paar voorbeelde van geïntegreerde volhoubare 
menslike nedersettings in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks bestaan. Onlangse 
voorbeelde dui op huise van ‘n beter gehalte, 'n groter verskeidenheid van 
behuisingsopsies en tipologieë, geskikter ruimtes, die funksionering van die 
ontwikkelingsverhoudings en die gebruik van verskeie finansieringsmeganismes. 
Aan die ander kant, alhoewel regeringsamptenare die meeste projekte aanvaar as 
synde dat hulle voldoen aan die vereistes van Breaking New Ground (BNG), 
voldoen hulle nie aan die vereistes van die BNG se beleid nie.  Hierdie studie voer 
aan dat die voorsiening van lae-inkomste-behuising bly fokus op die lewering van 
subsidies vir vrystaande huise sonder dat 'n reeks tipologieë en ook opsies ten 
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opsigte van verblyfreg verskaf word. Basiese en maatskaplike diensvoorsiening is 
gebrekkig en soms totaal afwesig. Hierbenewens is die huidige finansiële modelle 
vir die ontwikkeling van volhoubare menslike nedersettings in lae-inkomste 
gemeenskappe nie in staat om in die basiese behoeftes van die gemeenskappe te 
voorsien nie. Dis duidelik dat ‘n tekort aan vaardighede binne die regering verhoed 
dat die lewering van behuising versnel en dat die strategieë vir deelname deur 
burgers aan die proses ook gefaal het. Ten slotte beveel hierdie studie aan dat die 
huidige stelsel vir die toekennings van subsidies vir die lewering van skuiling en 
behuising weer nagegaan word. Ondersteuning moet gegee word aan instellings 
wat finansiering voorsien en dit behoort uitgebrei te word na lae- en middel-inkomste 
families wat kredietwaardig is. Kapasiteitsbou-programme behoort geskep te word 
vir plaaslike owerhede wat dan alleen sal omsien na plaaslike ontwikkeling. 
Gemeenskapsorganisasies behoort ook bemagtig te word om leweringsprosesse te 
bespoedig. Die provinsiale regering se magte en gesag moet inkrementeel 
oorhandig word aan plaaslike regering soos kapasiteit binne plaaslike owerhede self 
uitbrei. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
1.1  Background  
 
Before the democratic elections in 1994, colonial and apartheid spatial planning 
solidified racial and socio-economic segregation in black and coloured settlements 
throughout SA.  After the election, SA policies attempted to redress these spatial 
inequalities. The Housing White Paper (RSA, 1994:19), for example, called for the 
provision of secure tenure; permanent residential structures which would ensure 
privacy; and access to basic services for the poor and homeless. However, it also 
stipulated that the state could not meet the needs of the homeless, and that the 
fundamental pre-condition for attracting housing investment must be provided within 
a normalized market in order to attract private investment (RSA, 1994:19). This 
approach to housing delivery for the poor has been highly criticized over the years 
(Rust & Rubenstein, 1996; Tomlinson, 1998; Khan & Thring, 2003; Harrison et al., 
2003; Bond, 2003). Early post-apartheid developments lacked appropriate 
infrastructure, basic services, clinics, schools, green spaces and other amenities that 
higher-income areas took for granted (Donaldson, 2001:6). These developments 
were also characterised by small, low-quality units, which were built on the periphery 
of towns and economic centres (Gilbert, 2000:27). Furthermore, though subsidies 
were provided for citizens earning less than R3,500 in 1994, there were few  
affordable housing options available for people earning between R3,500 and R6,000 
per month. Credit for low-income families was also extremely limited (Rust, 2006:6, 
8). 
 
In 2004, after reviewing 10 years of post-apartheid housing performance, policy 
makers concluded that housing policies had failed to meet their objectives, and went 
back to the drawing board. In a move away from market-biased delivery regimes, the 
SA government launched Breaking New Ground (BNG) (DOH, 2004a) – an 
integrated sustainable human settlement policy which spotlights participative, multi-
dimensional approaches which are meant to allow citizens to become local 
participants in sustainable human settlement development rather than simply 
recipients of free, government-subsidised houses. BNG enables the establishment of 
a range of tenure, finance and delivery mechanisms, and purportedly aims to 
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empower the poor to become economically active via participative, integrated 
planning and equity in home ownership. 
 
 
1.2  Research problem  
 
Though current housing policy continues to underpin the need for secure tenure, 
quality, appropriate housing and services for the poor – has the new policy 
discourse, and its concomitant programmatic responses for implementation enabled 
effective delivery of integrated, sustainable, human settlements in South Africa? 
(DOH, 2004a: 7-12).  This is the key question within this study.  Sub-questions 
include:  Do current institutional arrangements within the three spheres of 
government enable or impede the delivery of sustainable settlements? Are the 
requisite skills available in government to deliver integrated, sustainable human 
settlements? Are there participation strategies in place which enable citizens to 
effectively become participants in human settlement development? Are current 
funding models able to meet the needs of no- and low-income individuals and 
families? The following sections will explain how these questions will be answered. 
  
 
1.3 Scope  
 
This study explores housing and settlement delivery in the context of subsidised and 
low-income housing for the urban poor in South Africa, and analyses performance 
against objectives enshrined in the South African policy environment. BNG espouses 
nine programmatic responses to integrated, sustainable settlement delivery and it is 
against these responses that South African performance will be measured (DOH, 
2004a:7).  These responses are: supporting  the entire residential property market; 
shifting from housing to sustainable human settlements; utilising existing and new 
housing instruments; redefining institutional arrangements within government; 
institutional support and capacity-building; restructuring financial arrangements; 
utilising housing as a job creation and poverty alleviation strategy; improved 
information, communication and awareness building and establishing systems for 
monitoring and evaluation (DOH, 2004a: 7-27). This study also measures project 
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performance against locally defined goals and objectives which project teams 
deemed BNG responsive. 
 
 
1.4 Research methodology  
 
In order to establish whether South African performance meets housing policy 
objectives, a comparative analysis is undertaken. South African policy objectives are 
compared to and contrasted with South African performance in the housing and 
settlement sectors. The researcher shall undertake a broad overview in chapter one, 
followed by two case studies in chapter two.  Case studies are examined in order to 
lend credibility to the argument that notwithstanding progress in achieving some 
BNG goals, most projects designated by government as BNG responsive1 fail to 
meet policy objectives. Comparative studies usefully focus on the similarities and 
differences of ‘objects’ or units of analysis (Mouton, 2001:51, 52). The units of 
analysis in this case are housing and settlement policies, and South African 
performance, as reflected in statistical data and measured in critical academic and 
professional reviews, government progress reports, personal observations, surveys, 
interviews and case studies. The exploration of case studies as empirical research is 
also selected as a suitable method for investigating the research problem. According 
to Mouton (2000:51-52) real-life objects, including physical objects, human actions 
and interventions can be measured empirically through active intervention in the real 
world. Yin (1994:13) states that case studies can be utilised to investigate ‘a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context’. Eisenhardt (1989:532-550) 
states that case study research is commonly utilised to more thoroughly understand 
the dynamics of specific projects or real-life situations. The case studies or objects of 
analysis herein are implemented projects deemed BNG responsive by South African 
government officials. In this context, interviews, reports and experiences of officials, 
contractors linked to selected projects, and beneficiaries provide critical information 
with regard to the success or failure of these projects in meeting policy and project 
objectives.  
                                                          
1 Officials were asked to measure whether settlements were responsive/compliant or non-
responsive/non-compliant when measured against BNG’s programmatic responses. These responses 
will be explored in the section that follows.   
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Surveys asking officials and project teams to respond to whether or not government 
and designated projects are BNG compliant were also undertaken in 2009. These 
surveys, and site visits to selected projects, were undertaken in 2009 and in 2010. 
The results of this data were then compared to and contrasted with South African 
policy objectives. In these surveys municipal and provincial officials from around the 
country were asked if provinces and municipalities are successfully responding to 
BNG policy objectives. These officials were also asked to provide details about 
challenges impeding BNG compliance. Interviews with officials, engineers, planners, 
urban designers and contractors directly involved in the implementation of the 
selected projects were conducted, as were interviews with residents in the same 
projects.  Information was gathered to ascertain whether the projects have met the 
South African policy criteria. Key and sub-questions were asked within the interviews 
and quantitative and qualitative data were collected. Quantitative data included the 
number of housing options, typologies and delivery mechanisms against targets and 
the level of basic and social services provided against targets. Qualitative data 
included responses to interview questions about whether implementers and 
community members felt project goals were communicated and achieved, and 
community needs were being met.  
 
 
1.5 Potential risks of the research 
 
This study forms part of a programme funded by the National Department of Human 
Settlements (NDHS), and the researcher reports to NDHS on programme progress.  
Officials and contractors approached within this study were aware of the reporting 
process between the researcher and the NDHS. Interviewees may therefore have 
responded to questions in a manner calculated to please their superiors versus 
responding objectively. However, it was also made clear in the interview process that 
this research would explore challenges and failures – as well as successes – to 
facilitate critical learning and feedback to NDHS as well as helping to improve human 
settlement outcomes. It must be noted that each official reported from his/her own 
individual professional experience, and therefore no single official could provide a 
complete picture of the sustainable human settlement implementation process in any 
given municipality, province or project. It must also be noted that measurement 
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results of specified projects were compared with responses from implementers and 
community members in order to gauge authenticity. In order to minimise risks, an 
objective and critical approach was pursued, not only in selecting interview questions 
but also in selecting interviewees themselves. Officials and project team members 
who were critical of selected projects were deliberately included in interviews in order 
to provide a more balanced assessment. Interviews with, and survey responses from 
officials and development professionals were then correlated with site visit 
observations and community interviews in order to provide a more balanced 
analysis. Though the majority of interviewees and survey respondents provided their 
names and roles within the developments, some wished to remain anonymous.  
 
 
1.6 Contributions of the research  
 
Through site visits and interviews; surveys and workshops; national challenges, 
successes and trends were established. An extensive literature review was also 
conducted by the researcher to shed light on research questions.  Research findings 
within this study will be disseminated to provincial and local government authorities 
to further assist them in their goal of implementing sustainable human settlements. 
 
 
1.7 Structure of the research  
 
The introduction provided a context followed by a definition of the research problem. 
The researcher further delineated the scope and the research method. In chapter 
one, the argument is presented for sustainable settlement development in an 
increasingly urbanised world. It provides definitions of sustainable settlements and 
cities. Chapter one also provides a brief history of the evolution of housing and 
settlement policy in order to determine whether implementation patterns have 
changed in recent history. Flowing from this, South Africa’s progress in delivering 
integrated, sustainable human settlements is measured by comparing and 
contrasting published statistics, government progress reviews, critical academic and 
professional literature, personal observations and interview results with the selected 
BNG policy objectives and with locally defined project objectives. In chapter two an 
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analysis of two case studies is presented. These case studies have been deemed 
‘BNG responsive’ by provincial and local government officials. In the final chapter, 
research findings are consolidated, and core conclusions are presented. 
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Chapter 2:  Sustainable cities and settlements? 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter one begins with an overview of global urbanisation patterns, which 
illustrates the need for sustainable settlement planning and development. Thereafter, 
definitions of sustainable settlements and post-apartheid policy objectives are 
explored. South African progress is then compared to and contrasted with selected 
policy objectives.  
 
 
2.2 The need for sustainable settlements  
 
In an increasingly urbanised world, the need for sustainable city and settlement 
development is becoming acute.  According to the UN Habitat (2006:6), it is 
projected that by the early 21st century, the world’s urban population will equal its 
rural population.  Between 2005 and 2030, the world’s urban population is projected 
to grow at almost twice the rate of the world’s total population, with international 
trends revealing that Asia and Africa will host the largest proportion of urban growth. 
By 2030, it is estimated that 80% of the world’s urban population will live in 
developing cities, with small cities (less than 500,000 people) and medium-sized 
cities (one to five million people) absorbing most of this urban growth (UN Habitat, 
2006:6). According to UN Habitat (2006:12) 32% of the world’s urban population 
lives in slums, and 90% of slums are located in developing cities. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 71.8% of the urban population lives in slums (UN Habitat, 2006:12). These 
statistics illustrate the urgent need for sustainable development practices, particularly 
in urban Asia and Africa. 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
8 
 
2.3 Challenges in sustainable settlement delivery 
 
Cities and urban settlements offer a concentration of goods and services like water 
and sanitation, garbage collection, electricity, roads, hospitals, schools, fire services, 
access to economic opportunities, and more. On the other hand, cities can also be 
environments where challenges are concentrated. The lack of water and sanitation 
services in poor areas can create environments rife with diseases like cholera, 
pneumonia and dysentery. Waste-water not properly removed and treated in cities 
and settlements can pollute groundwater and soil, causing further health and 
environmental risks. Lack of solid waste removal can create similar risks, and the 
lack of domestic energy services in poor areas often forces communities to cook with 
wood, paraffin and biomass which can cause respiratory infections and disease 
(WHO, 2004:138-140). The poor often build on waste sites, hillsides and next to 
industrial zones which often pose a danger to human health and well-being when, for 
instance, flooding and/or pollution occurs.  
 
In South Africa, unravelling the complex challenges entrenched by apartheid spatial 
constructs, including the distance of townships from economic opportunities and 
necessary services, has proven to be a mammoth task. Complex roles and authority 
structures within and between national, provincial and local government spheres 
slow down the rate of housing and sustainable settlement delivery. Arguably, current 
government subsidies rarely cover the cost of quality residential structures that 
ensure safety and privacy. The lack of skilled and experienced capacity in local 
authorities also poses severe delivery challenges. These challenges will be explored 
further in the following sections. The next section examines definitions of sustainable 
cities and settlements, and explores whether these definitions are meaningful in the 
South African context. 
 
 
2.4 Defining sustainable cities and settlements 
 
In attempting to measure sustainable settlement delivery, it is important to define 
what a sustainable settlement is. The following widely accepted definitions of 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
9 
 
sustainable cities are provided by Girardet (2004:419), Haughton (2004:65-73) and 
Sattherwaite (2004:6). According to Girardet, a sustainable city is: 
 
…a city that works so that all its citizens are able to meet their own 
needs without endangering the well-being of the natural world or the 
living conditions of other people, now or in the future (Girardet, 
2004:419).  
 
Girardet (2004:417-418) suggests that the move toward sustainability in city planning 
should include balance sheets which can track inputs, outputs and throughputs with 
regard to city resources. This requires systematic collection of data, and 
sophisticated knowledge management systems to track this data over time. 
Assigning rights to society and the environment by way of regulations; legal, political 
and educational systems that encourage responsible production and consumption, 
as well as creating systems that make those who damage or degrade the 
environment responsible for their actions, can also help cities to move towards 
sustainability targets (Haughton, 2004:65-68). 
 
Haughton (2004) uses a three-fold classification system to describe cities attempting 
to transit to sustainable patterns:   
 
 Redesigning Cities:  Those in which fossil fuel dependence has allowed 
planners to create urban sprawl, which explains the need for re-design. 
Bringing nature back into the city, planning for higher densities, and the 
reduction of waste and energy consumption are criteria used in redesigning 
cities; 
 Self-Reliant Cities: Aim not to export pollution beyond their borders; they try to 
reduce consumption; minimise waste and move toward the use of renewable 
technologies. These cities are bio-regionally sensitive and encourage 
participatory politics and interspecies equity; and, 
 Fair Share Cities: Create mechanisms for regulating environmental impacts.  
Environmental assets are traded in these cities, and there is an emphasis on 
reducing pollution, making waste streams more efficient and reducing energy 
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consumption. Those who pollute and degrade the environment are 
responsible for compensating society. Examples of these mechanisms include 
carbon trading schemes and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects 
(Haughton, 2004:68-73).  
 
According to Sattherwaite (2004:6), sustainable cities are those in which production, 
consumption, waste management systems, built form and governance structures 
match sustainable development objectives. Swilling (2004:9-10) argues that 
sustainability will only be achieved in cities and settlements if the extraction and use 
of non-renewables do not exceed the earth’s ability to renew these resources; 
renewables are substituted for non-renewables; wastes are not dumped in excess of 
the planet’s ability to absorb them; local ecosystems and biodiversity are not 
destroyed, and human needs are met by reducing the consumption of the rich and 
increasing access to natural goods and services for the poor.   
 
In the definitions listed above, natural resource use and environmental sustainability 
are foundational concepts. Most South African housing and policy documents 
include natural resource efficiency and environmental sustainability in their policy 
objectives. In practice, however, beyond the requirement that environmental impact 
assessments form part of the development planning process, few implementers 
include environmental sustainability or the sustainable use of resources in their 
development objectives. This is illustrated below and in chapter two.  
 
Arguably, sustainable resource use and the systems required to implement and 
measure sustainable resource use strategies are more readily adopted by developed 
countries that have stable political-economic structures and technical capacity. In the 
South African context, the continuous process of post-apartheid government 
restructuring has created an environment of administrative instability, which arguably 
compromises a sustainable resource use approach in the short to mid-term. The 
next section will explore the evolution of housing and settlement policy objectives, 
and South African performance will be measured against these objectives.  
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2.5 The post-apartheid housing challenge 
 
In order to determine whether current South African practice in sustainable 
settlement planning has evolved and adapted to changing economic and social 
drivers, it is necessary to explore its history. In 1994, the Housing White Paper (RSA, 
1994:5) estimated that by 1995, 68.7% of South Africa’s population would earn less 
than R1,500 per month; 11.8% would earn between R1,500 – R2,500 per month; 
5.6% would earn between R2,500 and R3,500 per month and only 13.9% of the 
entire population would earn more than R3,500 per month. Though post-apartheid 
housing policy allocated subsidies for households earning less than R3,500 per 
month, Department of Housing research suggested that by 1995, these wage 
earners would account for 86.1% of the entire South African population, namely 
36.85 million people (RSA, 1994:5,7 and own calculations). According to Callinicos 
(1996), by October 1995 only 10,600 state funded houses had been built.  
 
Given these alarming statistics, and the requisite demand for housing and 
sustainable settlement opportunities for poor and low-income families in post-
apartheid South Africa, have housing and settlement policies responded to the post-
apartheid challenge? What objectives are purported within housing and settlement 
policies, and are policy goals being achieved?  
 
 
2.6 Policy objectives and early post-apartheid housing performance 
 
There is little question that the post-apartheid housing policy discourse emphasised 
the need to redress the inequalities of the past.  For example: in 1994, the Housing 
White Paper called for the provision of secure tenure; quality residential structures 
which ensure privacy, equity in home ownership; access to economic activities for 
the poor; environmental sustainability; access to basic and social services; 
integrated, participative planning; consumer education;  and maximum devolution of 
powers to provincial and local government (RSA, 1994:15-49).  
 
The Housing White Paper (RSA, 1994:16) also ambitiously aimed to deliver 
participative, democratic and integrated settlements – within the shortest time frame 
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possible.  Between 1994 and 2004, the Department of Housing (DOH) spent R24.22 
billion on housing delivery; 1.5 million houses were constructed; and approximately 
six million poor South Africans were housed (DOH, 2004b:3). This is perhaps a world 
record in housing delivery. According to the DOH (2004b:3), the provision of shelter, 
basic connector services and secure tenure contributed significantly to poverty 
alleviation by securing an economic asset for the poor in the form of a residential 
house.   
 
However, one of the main critiques of this policy era was its neo-liberal, market-
driven response to housing delivery. The Housing White Paper (RSA, 1994:19) 
stipulated that the fundamental pre-condition for attracting housing investment must 
be provided within a normalized market in order to attract private investment. It also 
argued that the state could not meet the needs of the homeless.   This approach has 
been heavily criticised over the years (Rust & Rubenstein, 1996; Tomlinson, 1998; 
Khan & Thring, 2003; Harrison et al., 2003). The unintended consequences of this 
delivery paradigm include inequitable allocations of finance between low- and higher-
income families; the surfacing of a so-called housing finance gap in low-income 
families earning between R3,500 per month and R6,000 per month2; a lower than 
expected rate of delivery; community disempowerment through lack of appropriate 
consultative processes; a reluctance on the part of developers to be involved in low-
income housing delivery; and the inability of the National Housing Finance 
Corporation to increase access to credit and reduce interest rates for low-income 
families (Bond, 2003:47).  According to Bond, (2003:47) the Housing White Paper’s 
market-centred approach resulted in the reproduction of apartheid-style ghettos, and 
intensified the equally menacing structure of class apartheid across the country. 
 
Following the Housing White Paper, the Urban Development Strategy (UDS) (RSA, 
1997), and the subsequent Urban Development Framework (UDF) (DOH, 1997), 
advocated a market-centred, full-cost recovery housing delivery model. This 
translated into a subsidised one room, 30 square metre house with a toilet (Rust, 
                                                          
2 Rust (2006:8) explains that a ‘gap’ in affordable housing stock and in financial assistance for families 
earning between R3,500 and R6,000 per month who need affordable housing, was identified  post-
1994. This income group, and housing which is affordable for this income group, is referred to as the 
gap housing group or the gap housing market (Rust, 2006:8). 
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2006:8). Furthermore, the UDS identified private developers and construction 
companies to be the main drivers of housing delivery (Tomlinson, 2006:88). In an 
‘incremental’ approach to delivery, these agents were allowed to apply for subsidies 
for low-income communities to procure land and provide basic houses. Bulk and link-
infrastructural services were often only provided if funds were left over after land was 
purchased (Tomlinson, 2006:88). In some cases ‘serviced’ land equated to the 
provision of an erf, a foundation and an enclosed toilet (Tomlinson, 2006:91). 
Typically, the level of service provided in these communities was very poor. 
Communities that could not afford higher levels of service (e.g. graded roads, street 
lights [electricity], storm water reticulation, and onsite water and sanitation) were 
provided with communal taps, communal toilets and nothing more (Bond, 2003:50-
51).  
 
Though the UDF substantiated the need for urban densification and promoted a shift 
from ‘one household – one plot’ planning, in reality, low-density, single-household 
dwellings sprawled in settlements in and on the periphery of urban edges 
(Donaldson, 2001:6; DOH, 1997:31).  Dewar (1998:370) agrees that early RDP 
settlements were largely low density, lacking in social amenities and commercial 
facilities. He also states that, ‘It is usually impossible to discern any social, economic 
or environmental concerns in the making of these schemes, which seem to have 
been ordered simply by question of engineering efficiency’. 
 
Academics were not alone in their criticism of early post-1994 housing policy. 
Metropolitan councils also criticised the UDF, claiming it lacked integrated spatial 
plans for urban and urban-rural areas and that it failed to enable sustainable housing 
delivery. In 2001, the Department of Housing (now the Department of Human 
Settlements) formed a reference group to re-evaluate the Framework (Donaldson, 
2001:6).  
 
The Housing Act (Act 107 of 1997) reiterated the Housing White Paper’s goals by 
calling for the establishment of stable, sustainable homes; secure tenure; viable 
communities located in close proximity to economic opportunities, and the provision 
of basic and social services and amenities (RSA, 1997:3).  However, in a marked 
shift from the Housing White Paper (RSA, 1994), the principles within the Act (Act 
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107 of 1997) established government as an enabler of shelter delivery, rather than 
leaving provision solely to the market. Though this new role was meant to enhance 
delivery, critics claim policy objectives were still not met. 
 
According to Tomlinson, (2006:93) government’s primary aim in early housing policy 
was to provide security of tenure through home ownership and access to basic 
services through an incremental plan of delivering serviced sites with rudimentary 
structures. This was called ‘progressive’ and ‘incremental housing’.  A ‘breadth over 
depth’ delivery response was justified by developers in order to provide as many low-
income housing structures as possible (breadth), rather than building fewer 
structures of better quality (depth) (Tomlinson, 2006:96-97).  
 
This ‘breadth over depth’ approach had many unintended consequences. Dangor 
(1998:359-361) states that the lack of appropriate infrastructure and service delivery 
within these early developments reproduced apartheid patterns of inequitable 
distribution. He also states that the ‘look and feel’ of these RDP houses was 
reminiscent of apartheid ‘matchbox’ houses delivered in previously segregated areas 
(Dangor, 1998: 359-361). Early RDP settlements lacked clinics, schools, social 
services and access to economic activities (Donaldson, 2001:6). In 2000, Gilbert 
(2000,27) echoed this sentiment, stating that the quality of the solutions being 
delivered had disappointed many in terms of both the size of the units and the quality 
of construction, and beneficiaries felt they were worse off in their new circumstances 
than previously.  
 
Another important critique of early post-apartheid housing delivery is the impact 
housing policy had on the profile of housing units delivered. In 1994, it was estimated 
that 86% of South African households earned less than R3,500 per month, and there 
was an overwhelming need for subsidy support (Rust, 2006:6). For households 
earning slightly more than the R3,500 per month threshold, there were few, if any, 
affordable housing options available within their budget requirements (Rust, 2006:8). 
The availability of credit and end-user finance for low-income families was also 
extremely limited, and there was great reluctance on the part of lending agencies to 
extend credit to low-income earners (Rust, 2006:6).  
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In 2004, the DOH presented a 10-year progress report on the status of South African 
housing and human settlements to the United Nations (UN) Commission for 
Sustainable Development. This review concluded that integration in housing 
settlements had not been satisfactorily achieved due to misalignment of government 
funding streams and housing plans; the poor quality of low-income housing during 
this period and the location of low-income settlements on urban peripheries. 
Beneficiaries’ perception that their houses were not an asset, and the concomitant  
sale of houses at rates less the replacement value were also cited as reasons for 
failure to achieve set objectives (DOH, 2004b:4).  Limited participation from financial 
institutions in financing low-income settlements;  under-spending within housing 
departments; the slow rate of land transfer to municipalities for housing and the 
continued growth of informal settlements were also listed as barriers to the delivery 
of successful and sustainable housing settlements (DOH, 2004b:4). 
 
Several other obstacles and constraints were also identified. These included the lack 
of necessary support and funding for local government to successfully build 
integrated sustainable human settlements; the misalignment of budget cycles and 
processes within national, provincial and local government spheres; a lack of 
capacity within local government to successfully implement their new developmental 
role in settlement planning and delivery; and a lack of clarity between land-use 
management tools as established in the Land Use Management Bill (2008) and 
integrated development plans  (DOH, 2004b:6-7).  
 
Many critics of early post-apartheid housing policy argue that the 1990s were 
characterised as an era of quantitative delivery and government failure to meet its 
own objectives as established within South African policy documents. The market-
centred approach to housing delivery, which did not view housing as a single 
residential sector, generated a housing gap for families earning between R3,500 and 
R6,000 per month. Consultative processes with communities in this era were lacking; 
a lower-than-expected rate of delivery was apparent, and financial institutions failed 
to provide necessary services for low-income households. The quality of houses and 
level of service delivered to the poor were generally poor; social services and access 
to economic activities were lacking; and defective settlement planning invariably led 
to low-density, urban sprawl.  
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Following a 10-year progress review, the Department of Housing promulgated a new 
housing policy, Breaking New Ground (DOH, 2004a).   BNG continued to underpin 
original policy objectives by stating that sustainable settlements should be safe, 
secure developments with reliable and affordable basic services, adequate housing, 
access to welfare, police, education and health services (DOH, 2004a:11-12).  BNG 
states that settlements should be well-located, well-planned and close to economic 
opportunities. It calls for capacity-building programmes for government and 
communities, and states that implementers should take cognisance of the limits of 
natural resources (DOH, 2004a:7-27).  Additionally, BNG acknowledges the failure of 
previous contractor-built, market-driven delivery regimes and the preoccupation with 
number chasing. It reflectively points towards participative, multi-dimensional 
approaches that allow people to become participants in sustainable human 
settlement development rather than simply recipients of a Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) house (DOH, 2004a:11-12).  BNG provides for a 
broader range of tenure options; finance options which allow for the purchase of 
land; and a choice of housing typologies, densities and delivery mechanisms (DOH, 
2004a:8). BNG also calls for the accreditation of municipalities to enable them to 
manage a full range of housing delivery options (DOH, 2004a:23-25).  
 
BNG espouses seven specific objectives for housing delivery. The specific objectives 
are:  
 
1. The acceleration of housing delivery as a key strategy for poverty alleviation; 
2. The utilisation of housing provision as a major job creation strategy, enabling 
all citizens access to property and housing as an asset for wealth creation 
and empowerment;  
3. Leveraging growth in the economy;  
4. Promoting social cohesion; 
5. Combating crime and improving the quality of life for the poor;  
6. Supporting the functioning of the entire single-residential property market to 
reduce duality within the sector by breaking the barriers between the first 
economy residential property boom and the second economy slump; and, 
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7. Utilizing housing as an instrument for the development of sustainable human 
settlements, in support of spatial restructuring (which requires a link to 
Strategic Design Frameworks and spatial planning) (DOH, 2004a:7). 
 
BNG also establishes the means to achieve specified ends and provides instruments 
to be used in the process. These instruments, as mentioned before, include nine 
programmatic responses, which are meant to enable the achievement of BNG’s 
specific objectives. These responses are: 
 
1. Redefining  institutional arrangements within government;  
2. Information, communication and awareness building;  
3. The restructuring of financial arrangements; 
4. Institutional support and capacity-building; 
5. Shifting from housing to sustainable human settlements;  
6. The use of  existing and new housing instruments;  
7. Support for the entire residential property market;  
8. The utilisation of housing as a job creation and poverty-alleviation strategy;  
9. Establishing monitoring and evaluation systems (DOH, 2004a:7-27). 
 
To summarise, in recognising previous policy failures, policy makers enhanced 
previous policy objectives, allowing the state to become an enabler of housing 
delivery by way of programmatic responses within the new policy framework. It is 
against these programmatic responses that current South African housing and 
settlement performance is now analysed.  
 
 
2.6.1 BNGs aims and objectives:  assessing performance  
 
As mentioned above, this research forms part of a programme funded by the 
National Department of Human Settlements. In the formative phases of this 
programme, surveys of provincial and local government housing officials in all nine 
provinces were performed and results were collated during February to August of 
2009. Officials, planners, engineers and developers in all provinces were asked to 
state whether provinces, local authorities and developers were able to successfully 
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implement BNG’s programmatic responses. The same respondents were also asked 
to list core challenges which may inhibit the implementation of these responses. 
 
In a parallel process, officials from each province were asked to nominate ‘BNG 
responsive’ projects in their respective provinces. Site visits to all of these projects 
were completed by December, 2010, and project deliverables were measured 
against the same BNG programmatic objectives. Nominated projects are listed in 
Figure 2.1 below. 
 
 
TABLE 2.1:  Site Visits to Designated BNG Responsive Projects 
Province Project Dates Visited 
Western Cape (WC) Witsands October 21, 2009 
Gauteng Olievenhoutbosch December 1-3, 2010 
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) Mount Moriah May 6, 2009 
Eastern Cape  (EC) Zanemvula February 18-19, 2009 
Mpumalanga Klarinet June 30, 2009 
Free State (FS)  Grassland March 31, 2009 
Limpopo Potgietersrus Extension 20 March 18, 2009 
Northwest (NW) No project designated June 17, 2009 
Northern Cape  (NC) Lerato Park June 25, 2009 
 
During these site visits, officials were asked why they believed the nominated 
projects were responsive to BNG objectives. Personal observations were made by 
the researcher during these site visits. Community members were also interviewed in 
order to ascertain whether they agreed or disagreed with officials’ reports, and 
whether they felt their needs were being met.  Project responses were categorised in 
terms of a 100% score.  A ‘responsive’ score was given if an average of 66% or 
more of those interviewed provided testimony and evidence of the successful 
implementation of the BNG mechanism in question.  A ‘somewhat responsive’ score 
was given if 33%-66% of interviewees provided testimony and evidence of the 
successful implementation of the mechanism in question; and a ‘non-responsive’ 
score was allocated if less than 33% of those interviewed provided testimony and 
evidence of the successful implementation of the BNG mechanism in question. In 
each project, justifications for each response are given. The section which follows 
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provides an analysis of these results, as well as critical reflection on government’s 
progress to date.   
 
 
2.6.2 Redefining institutional arrangements within government  
 
This instrument calls for clearly defined roles within the various spheres of 
government, and institutional reforms in the housing and settlement sectors. It calls 
for integration between national and provincial development planning authorities and 
integrated development planning at local government level.  This instrument also 
enables local government to be the primary delivery agent for housing and 
settlement delivery through the use of integrated development plans (IDPs) and 
through municipal accreditation, which is meant to enable municipalities to manage a 
full range of housing interventions (DOH, 2004a:21-22).  
 
In 2009, participation in the IDP process in South Africa was labelled by UN Habitat 
as ‘professional participation’, with government departments dominating the process 
(UN Habitat, 2009:63). Though IDPs remain sophisticated, with complex policy 
instruments that  have great potential to enable coordinated local planning, the 
reality in many local authorities is one of institutional competition and conflict, lack of 
internal capacity to engage in IDP planning and implementation, patronage in 
tendering and in appointing consultants, and financial crisis (UN Habitat, 2009:63). 
Moreover, while the IDP process is meant to include community members and other 
stakeholders, in many towns and cities this has been limited to the presentation of 
IDP results on programmes and projects for public comment (UN Habitat, 2009:63).   
 
Some progress has been made in capacitating municipalities through the 
accreditation process. By 2010, all six metropolitan centres and some local 
authorities had been assessed and accredited, bringing the total number of 
accredited local authorities to 27 (Sexwale, 2010).  However, questions of equity and 
access come to the fore in the accreditation process. Christmas and De Visser 
(2009:114) argue that the onerous processes required to accredit municipalities 
excludes most local authorities. Many local authorities do not understand the 
requirements for accreditation, and furthermore have to bear the costs associated 
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with the accreditation process. Furthermore, accreditation of a municipality does not 
necessarily equate to a permanent transfer of authority. In accreditation contracts, 
cities are bound by contractual terms with provincial government, thus reducing them 
to implementers rather than drivers of local development (Christmas & De Visser, 
2009:113). 
 
In a further attempt to redefine institutional arrangements within government, the line 
function for providing sanitation throughout the country was shifted from the former 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry to the Department of Human Settlements 
(DHS). Additionally, plans were made to transfer other line functions to the DHS in 
order to promote sustainable human settlement delivery (DHS, 2010:8). Significantly, 
the DHS also negotiated the signing of an agreement with the Department of Public 
Works (DPW). This agreement gave the DHS the first right of refusal in respect of 
any land the DPW was considering for disposal (Sexwale, 2010).   
 
In responding to the question of whether government institutions have been 
effectively re-aligned (post-BNG), officials in all nine provinces stated that institutions 
have not been successfully re-aligned. For example, Hiliza (Gauteng survey 
response from Godfrey Hiliza, July, 2009) stated that the lack of integration between 
government spheres and departments, particularly regarding lengthy and 
cumbersome approval and procurement processes, has led to the failure of BNG 
implementation  objectives. Leshoe (Northwest survey response, Phenyo Leshoe, 
July, 2009) noted that many municipalities in the Northwest do not participate in or 
take ownership of development processes. These development processes include 
maintenance of infrastructure and taking part in inspections.   Mabaso (Northern 
Cape survey response, Ntokozo Mabaso, July, 2009) pointed out that in the Northern 
Cape it is difficult to ‘get’ other sector departments (like Health and Education) on 
board in housing delivery processes and Ndenze (Free State survey response, 
Loyiso Ndenze, July, 2009) stated that the lack of synergy in planning across the 
spheres of government, and laborious procurement processes are core challenges 
to successful implementation of this BNG objective  
 
When examining the institutional arrangements and frameworks within projects 
(deemed by the same officials as ‘BNG responsive’), somewhat different pictures 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
21 
 
emerge.  In Gauteng, it can be argued that the institutional frameworks established 
in the Olievenhoutbosh project (to be discussed shortly) led to the successful 
delivery of an integrated sustainable human settlement (Interview with Mala Harrilal 
on 2 December, 2010). In this project, Gauteng officials formulated a collaborative 
planning and delivery strategy which was driven by provincial and local government 
departments, community leaders, ABSA and the developer (Bigen Africa). These 
stakeholders negotiated the development process together, and adjusted BNG 
objectives to locally defined project objectives (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 
December, 2010).  
 
It can be argued that in six provinces the institutional mechanisms and frameworks 
adopted by project teams were ‘somewhat responsive’ to the BNG directive. For 
example, in the Eastern Cape (Zanemvula), representatives from national, provincial 
and local government, the Housing Development Agency (HDA), and community 
leaders met regularly to negotiate the development process (Interview with Jacko 
McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). Community leaders were democratically elected 
from the various areas in Zanemvula, and these leaders took the information from 
stakeholder meetings back to their communities. However, there was only one 
community liaison officer delegated to this project (which hosts an estimated 14,000 
people) (Interviews with Phakamile Ximiya and Ntomnizodwa Tangana on 19 
February, 2009).  
 
In the Free State (Grassland), intergovernmental and interdepartmental task teams 
were also established. Stakeholder teams from various national and provincial 
departments, and developers, designed and negotiated the development process 
together. However, the municipality rarely took part in these meetings (Interview with 
Mamiki Maboya on 31 March, 2009).   
 
In KwaZulu-Natal (Mount Moriah), government departments worked collaboratively 
together. Despite this, there were some community disputes over social and rental 
housing units (Interview with Ben Sithole on 6 May, 2009). Conversely, in the 
Western Cape (Witsands), community members and the developer negotiated the 
development process through collaborative stakeholder and training sessions, but 
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communications with government were strained (Interviews with Mothusi Guy and 
Patrick Hlwili on 25 May, 2009). 
 
In the Northwest, officials were not able to identify a BNG responsive project 
(Interview with Phenya Leshoe on June 17, 2009). In the Northern Cape, the Lerato 
Park project came to a standstill because of a dispute between the Sol Plaatjie 
municipality and the project managers (Interview with Sarel Haasbroek on 25 June, 
2009). These two projects could therefore arguably be deemed ‘not responsive’.  
 
This disconnect between official views and project realities may be attributed to the 
fact that the projects selected for review were deemed priority or best-practice 
projects, and thus the project-development processes were, in some cases, better 
resourced than the bulk of provincial  projects that were not deemed ‘best practice’, 
and  therefore not selected. 
 
 
2.6.3 Information, communication and awareness building  
 
This instrument calls for interdepartmental information sharing, communication and 
awareness building, particularly within communities (DOH, 2004a:21-22). Survey 
results and interviews with development professionals reveal that, when measuring 
this mechanism, a similar disconnect between views of officials and  actual project 
results emerges. Though officials in five provinces stated that this mechanism is not 
effective3, three projects could be argued to be ‘BNG responsive’ (Olievenhoutbosch 
in Gauteng, Potgietersrus in Limpopo and Mount Moriah in KwaZulu-Natal). In these 
projects, interdepartmental and inter-disciplinary task teams were established and, in 
the case of Gauteng, because stakeholders often did not speak the same language, 
a ‘translator’ was hired to negotiate communications between government, the 
developer, the bank and community members (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 
December, 2010). Three projects were deemed ‘somewhat responsive’. In the 
                                                          
3 Survey responses from Cedric Nemadzhilili (Limpopo, July, 2009); Caren Somiah and Loyiso 
Ndenze (Free State, July, 2009); Calvin Brummer (Eastern Cape, July, 2009); Phenyo Leshoe 
(Northwest, July, 2009); Miemie von Maltitz and Metse Mabeba  (Gauteng, July, 2009); and Ralukake 
Ndinannyi (Northern Cape, July, 2009). 
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Eastern Cape, leaders were democratically elected to be representatives in 
community forums in the Zanemvula project. Local, provincial and Housing 
Development Agency (HDA) officials guided and participated in these forums as well. 
In this way, information about project progress was meant to be shared (Interview 
with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). 
 
In the Free State, interdepartmental and intergovernmental steering committees and 
community members worked together to perform a community-needs analysis. 
Project goals were locally defined, based on this analysis. However, local 
government rarely came to these meetings (Interview with Mamiki Maboya on 31 
March, 2009). In the Western Cape, leaders were also democratically elected to 
represent local areas within Witsands, and these leaders took part in stakeholder 
meetings wherein the design and roll-out process for Witsands was determined. 
However, the City of Cape Town rarely took part in these meetings, and was often 
deemed ‘obstreperous’ to the process (Interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 
2009). Three projects were deemed to be BNG ‘un-responsive’. In the Northern 
Cape, as previously mentioned, disputes between the project manager and the 
municipality brought the Lerato Park project to a halt (Interview with Sarel Haasbroek 
on 25 June, 2009). In the Northwest, a BNG responsive project could not be 
identified (Interview with Leslie Moremedi on 17 June, 2009). In Mpumalanga, the 
lack of communication between the municipality and the Klarinet community resulted 
in strained relationships and ineffective delivery (Interview with Koshi Cheriyan on 30 
June, 2009). Again, this misalignment between survey responses (which state that 
communication and collaboration were ineffective) and project measurements may 
be due to the selection of ‘best-practice’ projects, in which additional human and 
other resources were allocated. 
 
 
2.6.4 Restructuring financial arrangements  
 
This mechanism enables subsidy allocations for households earning less than 
R3,500 to continue in the new policy era. Additionally, it enables households earning 
between R3,501 and R7,000 to access savings and credit-linked subsidies (DOH, 
2004a:23 – 24).  It also enables social housing institutions to provide subsidised 
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rental accommodation. Provision is also made for the accreditation of municipalities 
within this instrument. Accreditation is meant to reduce administrative and 
transaction costs and to improve delivery. 
 
Though subsidies continue to be provided, escalating prices increase the cost of 
delivering subsidised housing, while reducing the value of subsidies (DOH, 2007:18). 
Furthermore, inflation reduces developers’ profit margins, dis-incentivising trading in 
the subsidy market. In an attempt to provide affordable home ownership to the 
broader residential market, the state waived transfer costs on properties valued at 
less than R500,000 in 2007 (DOH, 2007:18-19).  However, land scarcity and the cost 
of well-located land limit the number of housing opportunities that can be provided in 
close proximity to economic opportunities (DOH, 2007:18-19). 
 
Survey results against this measurement reveal under-funding of BNG policy 
mandates (particularly at local government level), lack of coordination between 
provincial and local government budget cycles, lack of funding for bulk infrastructure, 
insufficient subsidy allocations; and that township and other cumbersome approval 
processes slow down delivery and increase costs.4  City of Cape Town officials state 
that well-located land is more often than not unaffordable for the city to purchase, 
and the City of Cape Town tends to hold onto land in the event that it might need to 
be sold to generate needed income (Interview with Barry Coetzee on 6 November, 
2009). A provincial government official in the Free State suggested that transparency 
in local government spending and anti-corruption systems and strategies are 
essential to the sustainable delivery of services via local government (Interview with 
Mamiki Maboya on 31 March, 2009). 
 
On a project level, only Mount Moriah and Olievenhoutbosch have a ‘responsive’ 
result against this measurement. The Ethekwini municipality provided top-up funding 
for an improved level of service for residents in Mount Moriah. In this project, land 
retention, improved roads, steps leading from roads to houses on steep gradients, 
and all basic services were provided for in the city’s budgeting process (Interviews 
                                                          
4 Survey responses from Walter Mothapo and Cedric Nemadzhilili (Limpopo, July, 2009); Kabelo Koloi 
(Free State, July, 2009); Calvin Brummer (Eastern Cape, July, 2009); Peter Mokobane (Northwest, 
July, 2009); Miemie von Maltitz (Gauteng, July, 2009); and Hastings Nel, Ndinannyi Ralukake and 
Saligh Suliman (Northern Cape, July, 2009). 
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with Ben Sithole and Winston Oakes on 25 June, 2009). In Gauteng, ABSA provided 
funding for bonded units and for an improved level of service for the entire 
Olievenhoutbosch development in order to attract bonded investments (Interview 
with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). 
  
It can be argued that two projects were ‘somewhat responsive’. In the Eastern Cape, 
Zanemvula was named a national priority project. Additional resources were 
allocated to Zanemvula, which included human resources from the HDA, and 
additional funds for solar water heaters (above and beyond the provision of basic 
services).  Densified rental housing and social services were also planned. However, 
these had not been delivered at the time of the interview due to financial constraints 
and uncoordinated budget cycles between province and local government (Interview 
with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). In the Western Cape, the developer 
(PEER Africa) provided additional funds for improved interventions in Witsands. 
These interventions included the use of overhangs, compact fluorescent lights (CFL), 
ceilings, insulation, and training in sustainable development. However, PEER is 
currently suing the City of Cape Town for non-payment (Interview with Mothusi Guy 
on 25 May, 2009). Five projects were deemed ‘non-responsive’ to this mechanism5. 
These results echo the officials’ cry that funding and financial arrangements have not 
been sufficiently or effectively restructured in relation to BNG objectives.  
 
Though a grant guarantee of R1 billion was approved for the gap housing market, 
and R12.4 billion for housing delivery was transferred to provinces in 2009 (Sexwale, 
2010), there is little evidence that these allocations are trickling down to low-income 
communities. Furthermore, the housing backlog increased to nearly 2.1 million in 
2010, which translated into 12 million citizens being without adequate shelter 
(Sexwale, 2010). According to Human Settlements Minister, Tokyo Sexwale, the 
housing backlog was being cleared at a rate of only ten percent per annum in 2010. 
Though the total budget for housing provision was R16.2 billion for the 2010/11 
financial year, it was recognised that current budget projections would not meet the 
needs of poor South African citizens (Sexwale, 2010). 
                                                          
5 Interview with Jackie Masike on March 31, 2009; Interview with Walter Mothapo on March 18, 2009; 
Interview with Vusi Bidi on June 17, 2009; Interview with Sarel Haasbroek on June 25, 2009; 
Interview with Koshi Cheriyan on June 30, 2009. 
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2.6.5 Institutional support and capacity-building  
 
Capacity-building, particularly for municipalities, is seen as a cross-cutting theme for 
delivering sustainable human settlements in BNG. This includes organisational 
development, institutional support, and capacity-building for community members 
and officials through education and training (DOH, 2004a: 22-23). However, capacity 
constraints, particularly in local government, are clearly evident.   
 
Researchers and government agencies alike recognise the skills shortages within 
local authorities (Lawless, 2007; National Treasury, 2008; Gwabeni et al., 2008; 
DBSA, 2009). Officials in five provinces identified skills and capacity shortages, 
particularly at local government level, as core challenges to effective service 
delivery. These skills gaps are particularly evident in the areas of engineering, 
project and financial management, town planning and community development. In 
addition, there is a need for skills development programmes for local and emerging 
contractors, as well as skills development and consumer education programmes for 
community members.6 
 
In the projects identified, only two projects in South Africa were deemed ‘responsive’ 
to this mechanism: Witsands in the Western Cape and Olievenhoutbosch in 
Gauteng. In both cases, local contractors were up-skilled and constructed the 
dwellings. Training in sustainable development and consumer education was also 
provided for community members in both projects (Interviews with Mothusi Guy on 
25 May, 2009; and with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). Only two projects 
were arguably ‘somewhat responsive’ to this mechanism. In Zanemvula, a 
community liaison officer was hired by the HDA, and training in sustainable human 
settlement development was provided for two small community groups (Interviews 
with Jacko McCarthy & Phakamile Ximiya on 19 February, 2009).  Some community 
training was also provided in Mount Moriah (Interview with Winston Oakes on 6 May, 
                                                          
6 Survey responses from Kabelo Koloi (Free State, July, 2009); Calvin Brummer (Eastern Cape, July, 
2009); Phenyo Leshoe and Peter Mokobane (Northwest, July, 2009); Hanson Mazibuko and 
Thokozani Hlatshwayo and Gratitude Booysen (Gauteng, July, 2009); and Ntokozo Mabaso and 
Saligh Suliman (Northern Cape, July, 2009). 
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2009). Officials linked to the other five projects were unable to identify capacity-
building programmes.7  This is in line with provincial survey responses. 
 
 
2.6.6 Shifting from housing to sustainable human settlements  
 
This programmatic instrument aims to enable implementers to move beyond the 
provision of subsidy houses in pursuit of the broader goal of building sustainable 
human settlements. Means to achieve this end include progressive informal 
settlement upgrading, the provision of medium-density housing solutions and the 
proposal that developers should integrate settlements by including 20% low-income 
housing opportunities within or adjacent to all new residential developments (DOH, 
2004a:12). This mechanism also promotes the release of well-located private, para-
statal and state-owned land to municipalities for housing developments (DOH, 
2004a:13-14).  
 
Though the principle of well-located settlements for the poor is a central feature of 
BNG, the high cost of land in inner-cities and the reluctance of local authorities to 
make central city land available for low-income housing developments continue to 
marginalise low-income earners (Cross, 2008:5). 
 
Officials in Limpopo stated that bulk infrastructure was inadequate, and lengthy 
approval processes impeded the delivery of sustainable human settlements 
(Limpopo survey response, Walter Mothapo and Cedric Nemazdzhilili, July, 2009). In 
the Eastern Cape, increasing housing backlogs, the lack of well-located land and 
shack re-invasion in informal settlement-upgrade projects were listed as 
impediments to sustainable settlement delivery (Eastern Cape survey response, 
Calvin Brummer, July, 2009). In the Northwest, delays in enrolment from the National 
Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC) and the slow release of land were 
listed as problematic (Northwest Province survey response, Peter Mokobane, July, 
2009).  Gauteng and Northern Cape provincial and municipal officials also listed 
                                                          
7 Interviews with Mohlago Masakela on March 18, 20009 (Limpopo); with Jackie Masike on March 31, 
2009 (Free State); with Lesley Moremedi on June 17, 2009 (Northwest); with Saligh Suliman on June 
25, 2009 (Northern Cape) and with Logan Appasamy on June 30, 2009 (Mpumalanga).   
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challenges with land availability and land transfer (Gauteng survey response, Miemie 
von Maltitz and Northern Cape survey response, Hastings Nel, July, 2009). In the 
Free State, lengthy and laborious approval processes and zoning constraints were 
also seen to impede delivery (Free State survey response, Loyiso Ndenze, July, 
2009).  
 
In measuring selected ‘BNG responsive’, projects, three can arguably be deemed 
‘responsive,’ (Olievenhoutbosch, Mount Moriah and Witsands); one ‘somewhat 
responsive’ (Potgietersrus), and five ‘not responsive’ in the shift from subsidy 
housing delivery to sustainable human settlement delivery.  In Olievenhoutbosch and 
Witsands, banks provided finance for gap housing. Funding was also allocated for 
multiple-density options and rental accommodation (personal observations and 
interviews with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009; and with Anton Boschoff on 2 
December, 2010).  In Gauteng, a suitable location was also provided near economic 
centres (personal observations and interviews with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 
2010). Durban’s Mount Moriah project provided medium-density bonded and rental 
housing options, and is well located near commercial and industrial nodes (personal 
observations and interview with Ben Sithole on 6 May, 2009).  In Limpopo, though 
gap housing has been planned, single, free-standing units dominate the 
Potgietersrus development, and water and sanitation services have not been 
delivered. However, this development is close to economic activities (personal 
observations and interview with Walter Mothapo on 18 March, 2009).  
 
In the Northwest, a BNG responsive project could not be identified (Interview with 
Phenya Leshoe on 17 June, 2009).  In the Eastern Cape, Zanemvula is far from 
economic activities. Planned rental and social accommodation were not delivered 
against targets, and the same applies to social amenities (personal observations and 
interview with Jacko McCarthey on 19 February, 2009). In the Northern Cape, the 
Lerato Park National Priority Project is on hold (Interview with Sarel Haasbroek on 
25 June, 2009). In Mpumalanga, the Klarinet project has not yet delivered on its 
sustainable settlement objectives (Interview with Koshi Cheriyan on June 30, 2009). 
Finally, Grassland (another National Priority Project in the Free State) is far from 
economic centres; there are no rental or social housing options and no social 
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amenities (other than a community centre) (personal observations and interview with 
Mamiki Maboya on 31 March, 2009).   
 
 
2.6.7 Utilising existing and new housing instruments  
 
In this programmatic response, the provision of subsidy housing continues to 
underpin delivery. However, these instruments are meant to be enhanced to address 
demand-side needs. Emphasis is placed on participative planning through 
‘enhanced’ People’s Housing Process initiatives. The Enhanced People’s Housing 
Process (ePHP), which replaced the old PHP programme and which was adopted in 
July 2008, ostensibly allows for greater flexibility and choice while maintaining the 
central principles of people-centred development.  The policy framework states that 
beneficiaries should actively participate in decision-making in the housing process 
and should make a contribution in such a way that: 
 
a. Beneficiaries are empowered individually and collectively so that the 
community ultimately takes control of the housing process themselves. 
This includes identifying the land, planning the settlement, getting 
approvals and resources to begin the development, contracting out or 
building the houses and providing the services, living in and upgrading 
their homes and continually improving the community; 
b. Various partnerships are created; 
c. Social capital is retained and expanded upon as the process builds on 
existing livelihood strategies and creates all kinds of associated poverty 
alleviation opportunities for the community; 
d. Housing is valued as an asset far beyond its monetary value for all the 
value added components it provides for individual household members 
and for the family as a whole; 
e. Housing citizenship is built, with beneficiaries being aware of their housing 
rights and responsibilities; 
f. Local economic development is promoted with money spent being kept in 
the community, thereby increasing the local multiplier effect; 
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g. Stable communities with a direct stake in the future of their 
neighbourhoods are fostered; 
h. Houses are built that are better suited to the needs of individual 
households; 
i. Women and the youth are more directly involved in the process, ensuring 
skills transfer; 
j. Human settlements are built that are more sustainable because they are 
more inclusive and more responsive to the needs of the community and 
because communities have invested directly in the process (DHS, 2009:9-
10). 
 
Demand-side responses are also spotlighted via the provision of social and rental 
housing (DOH, 2004a:16). New instruments include support and funding for informal 
settlement upgrades through phased, in-situ upgrading (DOH, 2004a:17). This 
instrument aims to support social cohesion within communities, to minimise 
community disruption and to enhance participation (DOH, 2004a:17). The enhanced 
People’s Housing Process (PHP) instrument calls for the redefinition of ‘…the nature, 
focus and content of PHP in order to build greater consensus and understanding 
between all stakeholders of the focus and intention of PHP in order to address 
previous contradictions in the PHP delivery process’ (DOH, 2004a:17,18).   
 
Another instrument that is purported within this BNG responsive mechanism 
facilitates the establishment of effectively managed social, medium-density housing. 
Social housing includes mixed-income opportunities in apartments, multi-level flats, 
cooperative group-housing units, communal and transitional housing developments. 
New funding instruments based on the needs of the project are also meant to be 
provided, and institutional capacity is meant to be scaled up through national social-
housing accreditation institutions and establishment grants via the Social Housing 
Foundation (DOH, 2004a:18-20).  
 
Though enhanced PHP aims to improve housing delivery, BNG does not specify how 
these processes will be effectively implemented and, as a result, questions arise as 
to the effectiveness of the various PHP models.  Tomlinson questions whether this 
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new approach will match the scale of delivery achieved by previously contractor-
driven responses (Tomlinson, 2006:99).  
 
In an attempt to strengthen the social accord with civil society, and to increase the 
effectiveness of PHP processes, the National Department of Human Settlements 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Federation of the Urban 
Poor (Fedup) and Slum Dwellers International (SDI) in September, 2008 (DOH, 
2009:51). Fedup and SDI were, and still are, arguably the largest network of civil 
activists in the housing/micro-savings sector in South Africa.  In order to effect the 
MoU between government and Fedup/SDI, joint working groups were established in 
nine provinces. A consultation model was also established for other partnering 
agencies, in which a code of ethics, roles and responsibilities were delineated (DOH, 
2008:52).  
 
In May, 2008 PEER Africa was tasked to review the Federation’s progress and to 
provide critical feedback for the Federation. PEER found that the unrealistic 
expectations of Federation members increased the rate of delivery failure. For 
example, PEER concluded that project management and conflict-resolution skills, 
and the systems required to build self-help houses within the Federation were 
seriously lacking (Guy, 2009:10; Interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009). 
PEER explained that the overall Fedup PHP model lacked realistic project plans; 
dedicated and skilled PHP project managers with clearly defined tasks; clear and 
transparent budgets and formal contractual and reporting agreements (Guy, 
2009:10,19).  
 
In addition, Federation members and members of their Community Construction 
Management Teams (CCMTs) had unrealistic expectations regarding housing size 
and delivery. For example, PEER found that community members expected to build 
56 square metre houses on the assumption that CCMT beneficiaries would make up 
the difference in cost between the subsidy allocation and the cost of a larger unit, 
without the requisite savings set aside for an improved product. PEER stated that 
this was a defective value proposition and a ‘departure of expectation from reality’ 
(Interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009). 
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PEER concluded that the current Fedup project model is too ambitious and is 
inherently high-risk. In this model, less-skilled, dispersed and often isolated 
community contractors are expected to ‘out-perform’ larger, more experienced 
contractors. In other words, community contractors were being called upon to 
produce larger units without concurrent budgets and project management systems in 
place (Interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009). PEER’s final recommendation 
was that Fedup should agree on a short-, mid- and long-term plan of action in order 
to rectify delivery problems (Guy, 2009:22). 
 
Though the South African chapter of SDI struggles with delivery, others within the 
SDI network are more successful. In Lilongwe (Malawi), 50 women from the 
Mtandire informal settlement in Lilongwe City formed a savings club in 2003. These 
women also married the concept of savings to housing delivery. Moreover, their 
savings club at present has over 15,000 members, and is now affiliated to SDI 
through the Malawi Homeless People’s Federation (MHPF) (Manda et al., 2011:4). 
By December 2010, Malawi Federation groups had successfully negotiated with 
government and acquired land for over 3,000 members in several urban centres 
(Manda et al., 2011:4). The main difference between the South African and 
Malawian approaches to mobilising savings for housing is the provision of training 
and capacity-building programmes for Malawian savers and builders, which has 
yielded positive results in Malawi (Manda et al., 2011:7).  
 
Other challenges identified in PHP delivery in South Africa include resistance from 
housing authorities to work with organised civil society, lack of technical capacity in 
supporting the PHP process both on government and civic levels, and lack of 
integration and alignment in  municipal and provincial planning and budget cycles 
(DOH: 2009:51). Lemanski (2008:399) argues that beneficiary participation in the 
housing process can be viewed as a poverty reduction mechanism. However, 
capacity must be built in communities in order to enable community members to 
collectively identify problems and consider solutions. Lemanski (2008:399) also 
argues that community incapacity hinders successful housing delivery and 
constrains the potential for poverty alleviation.  In addition, he identifies the following 
factors for non-delivery in South Africa: internal divergent agendas; organisational 
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inexperience with managing community processes; external exploitation and 
controls; and structural constraints (Lemanski, 2008:399). 
 
In addition to the promotion of an ‘enhanced’ People’s Housing Process, BNG also 
advocates upgrading informal settlements. Though BNG promoted this instrument in 
2004, it was only in 2008 that a general consensus was built around in-situ upgrades 
of existing informal settlements that were well-located. Critical attention was also 
paid to building mixed-income settlements which could draw middle-income earners 
into the city’s tax pool, while cross-subsidising lower-income earners (Cross, 
2008:6). The National Upgrading Support Programme was established to provide 
support to municipalities for in-situ upgrading. A project process guide is currently 
being compiled to assist developers, contractors and implementers working on in-
situ upgrade projects, and this guide will also function as a project-management and 
monitoring tool for project managers (Topham, 2010). Though in-situ upgrades are 
being promoted, their implementation requires strong social compacts and extensive 
participative engagement. There are few officials trained in participatory strategies, 
and many are simply unwilling to engage in these intensive processes.8 
 
Though the use of existing and new housing instruments is meant to enhance 
delivery and shift the housing sector away from single-dwelling subsidy 
developments, subsidy housing still dominates the low-income settlement delivery 
agenda.  Very few best practice projects include in-situ upgrades, PHP, social/rental 
housing units, or densified units. It must be added that though officials and 
developers in the projects identified have delivered better quality units which do 
afford privacy, the only projects which have incorporated gap housing are 
Olievenhoutbosch in Gauteng and Witsands in the Western Cape (personal 
observations and interviews with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009; and with Anton 
Boschoff on 2 December, 2010).  Gap housing has been planned and budgeted for 
in Potgietersrus in Limpopo, but had not yet been delivered at the time of the 
author’s site visit (Interview with Mike Minty on 18 March, 2009). Rental and higher-
                                                          
8 This observation was made in three executive courses run at the Sustainability Institute in 2009 and 
in 2010 wherein the bulk of officials attending the courses suggested that community members should 
simply be happy with the housing and services that government provides, without complaint; that it is 
the government’s responsibility to make decisions for communities; and that participatory processes 
are messy and slow down already cumbersome delivery processes.  
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density units have been built in Olievenhoutbosch and Witsands, and training for 
community members was provided in both projects (personal observations and 
interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010 and interview with Mothusi Guy 
on 25 May, 2009). Higher-density options have been built in Mount Moriah (personal 
observations and interview with Ben Sithole on 6 May, 2009). Witsands is the only 
‘best practice’ project identified which included PHP processes in its development 
model (Interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009). Project teams linked to six 
selected provincial projects could not identify project-related strategies which 
responded to this BNG objective.9  
 
 
2.6.8 Supporting the entire residential property market 
 
This instrument aims to provide support not only for households that qualify for a 
uniform subsidy, but also for lower-middle income (or gap) households (earning 
between R3,500 and R7,000 per month) by collapsing subsidy bands in order to 
incentivise private sector investment. New subsidies and financial instruments linked 
to household savings and loans from financial institutions are meant to facilitate 
access to financial assistance for gap households, while overcoming the down-
payment barrier experienced by this income group (DOH, 2004a:7-8). This 
instrument is meant to shift the delivery focus from a one household – one plot 
delivery  format to a demand-responsive approach that includes the provision of 
funding for a variety of housing typologies, tenure options and delivery mechanisms 
for various income groups with differing needs (DOH, 2004a:8).  
 
In response to the provision of various tenure options, DHS continues to provide 
subsidies for no- and low-income earners using a variety of subsidy and loan 
mechanisms. However, in the provision of subsidies and loans for low- to middle-
income earners who do not fall within the subsidy band, questions arise as to the 
                                                          
9 Interview with Jacko McCarthy on February 19, 2009 (Eastern Cape); interview with Logan 
Appasamy on June 30, 2009 (Mpumalanga); interview with Mamiki Maboya on March 31, 2009 (Free 
State); interview with Saligh Suliman on June 25, 2009 (Northern Cape); interview with Logan 
Appasamy on June 30, 2009 (Mpumalanga) and interview with Mohlago Masekela on March 18, 2009 
(Limpopo).   
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ability of these earners to access housing finance. For example, the Broad-based 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Act (Act 53 of 2003), which led to the 
Financial Sector Charter10, gave low-income earners the ability to access credit. This 
has led to excessive indebtedness in low-income households, particularly with 
regard to credit and shop cards, thereby undermining their ability to access housing 
finance (Rust, 2006:9). 
 
Project responsiveness to this mechanism suggests that five nominated ‘best 
practice’ projects are ‘non-responsive’, as they only provide free-standing subsidised 
housing units (personal observations during site visits). Mount Moriah in Durban is 
somewhat responsive, as some densified options were made available (Interview 
with Winston Oakes on 6 May, 2009). In Limpopo, the Potgietersrus project is also 
‘somewhat responsive’ (Interview with Mike Minty on 18 March, 2009). Once again 
Witsands and Olievenhoutbosch are the only two projects that can arguably be 
deemed ‘responsive’ (personal observations and interviews with Anton Boschoff on 2 
December, 2010 and with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009).  
 
 
2.6.9 Utilising housing as a job creation and poverty alleviation strategy  
 
BNG aims to promote job creation through the use of labour-intensive construction 
methods and through investment in socio-economic and technological infrastructure. 
On-site materials production is encouraged and capacity-building programmes for 
black economic empowerment in the construction sector are also mandated (DOH, 
2004a:25). 
 
Officials surveyed listed several criteria for job creation strategies in poor 
communities. Walter Mothapo (Interview with Walter Mothapo on 18 March, 2009) 
viewed location as a core part of the job creation agenda.  Others included the use of 
local labour (Interviews with Mothusi Guy & Patrick Hlwili on 25 May, 2009). One 
                                                          
10 In 2002, National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) committed itself to the 
development of a Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) charter. The Financial Sector Charter is a 
transformation charter in terms of the BEE Act (Act 53 of 2003). It aims to transform the financial 
sector through the provision of accessible financial services to black South Africans. 
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provincial official (in the Free State) felt that the development of a local community 
centre which provided a number of jobs for local community members was 
responsive to this mechanism (interview with Caren Somiah on 31 March, 2009). 
However, only Witsands in the Western Cape incorporated an exhaustive job-
creation strategy through training, small-business development, linkages to 
economic activities within and outside the local geographic area and a business 
model that required three income-generating projects to run concurrently in case one 
or two failed to generate income (Interview with Mothusi Guy on 25 May, 2009). It is 
therefore understandable that this project was deemed ‘responsive’ to this policy 
directive.  
 
Four other projects were deemed ‘somewhat responsive’.  As mentioned above, the 
Grassland project team in the Free State included a community centre in its project 
planning model. This centre provided jobs for crèche workers. It also provided space 
and support for sewing and beading projects, which generate income through sales 
of school uniforms to local schools and beadwork sales through a local craft market. 
The location of this project, next to a middle-income community, also enabled some 
local residents to find employment as domestic help in the neighbouring community 
(Interview with Adelina Dibeco on 31 March, 2009). Mount Moriah and 
Olievenhoutbosch included the use of local labour, and both projects are located 
close to commercial and economic activities (Interviews with Ben Sithole on 6 May, 
2009 and Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). Limpopo’s Potgietersrus project is 
also well-located, with easy access to social services and economic activities 
(personal observations during site visits). Though location is a key factor in KwaZulu-
Natal, Gauteng and Limpopo, job creation strategies were not established per se, 
and it must again be noted that these selected projects are not representative of all 
projects within the provinces. The Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, Northwest and 
Northern Cape projects were deemed ‘non-responsive’ to this mechanism, as none 
of these project teams utilised instruments to create jobs.11 
 
 
                                                          
11 Interviews with Jacko McCarthy on February 19, 2009 (Eastern Cape); with V. Mtsweni on June 30, 
2009 (Mpumalanga); with Peter Mokobane on June 17, 2009 (Northwest) and with Lennie Barnes on 
June 25, 2009 (Northern Cape). 
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2.6.10 Establishing monitoring and evaluation systems 
 
This instrument aims to improve data collection, information management systems, 
performance measurement, and monitoring and evaluation within the housing sector. 
New systems are meant to track and store more accurate information, particularly 
regarding subsidy housing (DOH, 2004a: 27). Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and 
monitoring, evaluation and reporting (MER) systems aim to enable the three spheres 
of government to report on their performance in respect of the implementation of 
BNG against a set of measurable indicators. The monitoring system was enhanced 
to monitor provincial housing departments in meeting targets set in the various 
provincial business plans. The monitoring process is also meant to verify and 
validate the value of products delivered under conditional grants (DOH, 2009:7-8).  
 
Though the Municipal Finance and Management Act (MFMA) (Act 56 of 2003) 
requires strict reporting from municipal finance officials on expenditures, only three 
projects visited had monitoring, evaluation and reporting (MER) systems in place to 
measure project performance against BNG objectives and locally determined project 
goals. For example, PEER Africa (Witsands) measured economic performance 
against the number of job creation/business-development strategies in the pipeline 
(within the community) at any given time; PEER Africa measured the number of 
community members trained in sustainable settlement development design (with a 
particular focus on energy efficiency); the number of people trained to build houses 
and the number of community members working on locally constructed housing 
projects (Interview with Patrick Hlwili on  25 May, 2009).  BIGEN Africa 
(Olievenhoutbosch) measured project progress by the variety of housing typologies 
and delivery mechanisms utilised (gap, densified options, rental stock); the location 
of the settlement near to economic activities and the number of small contractors 
used within the development project (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 
2010). In Mount Moriah, the city measured progress against improved levels of 
service, the provision of a variety of housing typologies and options (rental and 
densified options) and the number of trained community members. Limpopo, on the 
other hand, was deemed ‘somewhat responsive’. Though officials and Standard 
Bank verbalised that they had agreed in principle to adopt ecological design criteria 
in the design process (north orientation, the use of overhangs and solar water 
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heating) and to include gap housing and training in the development process, these 
criteria had not been reduced to an MER system against which to measure progress 
(Interview with Mike Minty on 18 March, 2009).  
 
Though monitoring and evaluation is a foundational principle of BNG, the Monitoring, 
Evaluation and Impact Assessment (MEIA) Policy and Implementation Framework 
was only established in the housing sector in 2009. This system requires all three 
spheres of government to report on BNG performance against measurable 
indicators, and requires provinces and municipalities to measure progress, success 
and failure against targets set in provincial and local government business plans 
(DOH, 2009:7).  At the time of this study, the MEIA system was not yet in place.  
 
 
2.7 Conclusion  
 
It seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would 
be reorganised. Presumably the plans for our employment were being 
changed. I was to learn later in life that, perhaps because we are so good at 
organising, we tend as a nation to meet any new situation by reorganising; 
and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while 
producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization (Charlton Ogburn, Jr. 
1957). 
 
According to Menguele et al. (2008:179) though BNG presents a developmental 
vision, questions arise as to whether the state has the technical, managerial and 
administrative capacity to deliver on its ambitious vision. Moreover, many of the 
critical programmatic responses advanced in BNG were not finalised when it was 
promulgated in 2004. For example, in 2004, a plan of action to integrate government 
departments and interests in sustainable settlement delivery was lacking and still is 
(Menguele et al., 2008:195). This will be explored in the sections to come. In 2004, 
developers and banks responded to state incentives in the subsidy market on a 
voluntary basis, and they continue to do so. Up until 2009, a robust monitoring and 
evaluation system was lacking (DOH, 2009:7).  By 2010, only 27 municipalities 
countrywide were accredited (Sexwale, 2010). According to Pieterse and Van Donk 
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(2008:65-66) vertical and horizontal integration in delivering sustainable human 
settlements was still severely challenged years after BNG was promulgated. 
 
On a broader level, post-apartheid public sector restructuring continues to leave 
chaos in its wake. For example, in 1993 the City of Cape Town was governed by 61 
municipalities and managed by 17 separate administrations. Thereafter, Cape Town 
established seven local government authorities from the former 61 municipalities in 
order to strive for more autonomy. The Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 1998) 
outlined new systems of metropolitan government leading to the establishment of the 
Cape Town Unicity – a single-tiered form of metropolitan government. This so-called 
“Unicity” structure secured a single metropolitan tax base in an attempt to address 
development disparities. This process of municipal restructuring and its impact on 
service provision has been well documented (Khosa, 2000; Parnell & Pieterse, 2002; 
Jaglin, 2004). Formerly segregated white local authorities (WLAs) and black local 
authorities (BLAs) were amalgamated in an attempt to ensure greater equity 
between rich and poor communities, and to help standardize service delivery. This 
restructuring process has taken its toll. Institutional memory loss and capacity gaps 
are evident throughout the country (Lawless, 2007; National Treasury, 2008; 
Gwabeni et al., 2008;  DBSA, 2009). Capacity-building programmes are not keeping 
up with the vast need (Lawless, 2007; National Treasury, 2008; Gwabeni et al., 
2008; DBSA, 2009). Moreover, participation strategies between government and 
communities in establishing integrated sustainable human settlements are near non-
existent (this is explored below).  
 
This highly complex process of transforming and de-racialising political governance 
was also underpinned by the ‘new public management’ approach to institutional 
reform and the decentralization of some national government functions to local 
government level.  Privatization, service delivery on a cost-recovery basis and the 
implementation of performance management systems were also part of the process 
of institutional reform (Wilkinson, 2004; Parnell & Pieterse, 2002). By 2008, 
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municipal services in Cape Town were still delivered either directly by or through 
sub-contractors via the City of Cape Town.12 
 
Like most other South African cities, even a cursory glance at Cape Town and its 
sprawling informal settlements suggests development patterns have not changed 
much in the last 15 years.  At the time of this study, planning and zoning regulations 
had not been updated to reflect a more democratic approach and RDP and low-
income housing developments are still burgeoning on the urban peripheries. 
Significantly, there have been no changes to the way in which housing, energy, 
water, sanitation, solid waste and other services are delivered and distributed 
(Cullinan, 2006:3). 
 
Continuing with the Cape Town example, one can understand Bond’s argument that 
a new form of class apartheid has emerged (Bond, 2003). According to Swilling 
(2006:33-34), there were nearly 800,000 households in Cape Town in 2006, with a 
rapidly expanding population of around 3,5 million people, 30% of whom were 
unemployed.  More than 50% of Cape Town’s population was classified as poor in 
2006, and it was estimated that 16% of the richest households occupied some 40% 
of the total surface area (Swilling, 2006:33-34). The legacy of land control and 
unequal land ownership continues to hinder low-income housing delivery, while 
protecting private property rights of the wealthy and elites (Thomas, 2010:7). In 
summary, systematic institutional fragmentation and the lack of skilled capacity to 
deliver against policy goals have served to increase development inequalities rather 
than alleviating them.   
 
Though BNG promotes access to housing and services for all, these services are 
dependent on fiscal resources. A constant theme within government administrations 
has been the need to address the service backlogs in the poorer areas of cities. 
However, this has major implications for capital and operating expenditures in city 
service-delivery sectors (particularly energy, waste, water, sanitation and housing) 
                                                          
12 This conclusion was drawn after various workshops were held with City officials in 2008. These 
workshops formed part of a United Nations Development Programme - funded baseline analysis of 
services and financial streams in the City of Cape Town.  
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which, together, account for the bulk of city expenditure.13  For example, in 2007, 
there was a general consensus that the rollout of basic services to meet the needs of 
the poor could no longer be at the expense of essential maintenance and 
refurbishment of existing city-wide infrastructures.14 
 
In the next chapter, two South African best practice case studies, as designated by 
provincial and local government officials, are measured against the same BNG policy 
objectives discussed previously.  Additionally, ‘locally’ defined objectives set out by 
the implementing agents themselves are explored.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 This information was gleaned in a workshop run by Aneel Radhakrishna with City of Cape Town 
finance officers and the researcher on 8 October, 2007. 
14 Ibid 
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Chapter 3:  Case Studies 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In December 2008, the then National Department of Housing (NDOH) and the 
Sustainability Institute (SI) signed a Memorandum of Agreement detailing a 
collaborative three year capacity-building programme. This programme aimed to 
assist the NDOH with operationalising BNG. The researcher of this study is also the 
programme coordinator for the NDOH programme, and thus had access to all case-
study information as detailed below.  
 
Deliverables in Phase One included surveys of provincial and local government 
housing and human settlement officials, as well as site visits to national “Priority 
Projects” and government-designated BNG responsive projects. The purpose of 
these visits was to gain a better understanding of project processes, current stages 
of development, successes and challenges related to BNG implementation, and to 
ascertain capacity needs at provincial and local government level with regard to 
integrated settlement planning and delivery. As explored in the previous chapter, 
information was gained from provincial and local government officials in each 
province, as well as from contractors assigned to the respective projects.15  Chapter 
two provides an in-depth analysis of two case studies, namely Olievenhoutbosch in 
Gauteng and Zanemvula in the Eastern Cape. Each case study concludes with an 
analysis of policy and project achievements measured against policy and locally 
defined project goals.  
 
 
3.2 Case study 1:  Tshwane - Olievenhoutbosch 
 
In July 2009, Olievenhoutbosch (OVB) was nominated by the City of Tshwane as the 
best practice BNG case study for Gauteng. In July 2009 and December 2009, 
                                                          
15 Questions posed included: Are these projects deemed BNG responsive? Why? What were the 
challenges and constraints in delivering against BNG targets? Were additional objectives set by the 
project teams, and were these objectives met? What were the lessons learnt? 
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interviews and a site visit were arranged by the Tshwane Department of Housing. 
Another site visit occurred in December 2010. Community members were 
interviewed, as were provincial and local government officials and the director of the 
consulting engineering firm (Bigen Africa). 
 
 
3.2.1 Overview 
 
In response to the Financial Sector Charter and a subsequent Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) - signed between the Banking Association of South Africa and 
the National Minister of Housing in 2004 – ABSA utilised an existing property in their 
portfolio to build Olievenhoutbosch. The City of Tshwane (COT) deems this project 
‘best practice’; firstly, because it aims to respond to the BNG instruments of 
redefining institutional arrangements within government;  integration of racial and 
socio-economic groups and the provision of a variety of housing typologies and 
finance mechanisms. Secondly, it includes social services and amenities (a sports 
ground, community facilities, a library, a shopping complex, taxi ranks) in addition to 
providing houses and basic services. Thirdly, it provides access to economic 
opportunities and employment through Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) 
job creation initiatives, and capacity-building through accredited skills training 
programmes (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). These 
responses are in line with the BNG instruments as defined in chapter one.  
 
 
3.2.2 Area challenges prior to development  
 
When interviewed about conditions in Choba (one of OVBs informal settlements) 
prior to development, respondents described the conditions as ‘very bad’ (Interview 
with Gary Moodley on 3 December, 2010). For example: there were no toilets in 
Choba, so residents used the bush to relieve themselves (Interview with Margaret 
Molefe on 3 December, 2010). It was difficult to access water in the settlement. 
There was no electricity; paraffin stoves were used for cooking; many suffered from 
hunger and there was very little space between shacks (Interview with Margaret 
Molefe on 3 December, 2010). People migrated to these camps for various reasons. 
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The reasons cited included: unemployment and the concomitant need to live closer 
to economic opportunities; many could not afford to pay rent for existing 
accommodation so they moved to the informal settlements, and family arguments 
caused some to leave their family home and migrate to the informal settlements.  
Most were unable to purchase their own house and some were on waiting lists for 
RDP housing (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). 
 
Camp 1 (another informal settlement in OVB) conditions were also described as 
‘inhumane’. People used the long drop toilet system; sanitation provision was 
inadequate and many people fell victim to dysentery and other diseases (Interview 
with Paulina Mohale on 3 December, 2010). In Camp 2, one resident described the 
shacks as hot and leaky (Interview with Paulina Mohale on 3 December, 2010). The 
bucket toilet system was ineffectively used and it was reported that residents 
sometimes found human excrement on their doorstep (Interview with Paulina Mohale 
on 3 December, 2010). Rats ate food left out of sealed containers (Interview with 
Gary Moodley on 3 December, 2010). Overcrowding, and a general lack of privacy 
between parents and children rendered living conditions difficult (Interview with 
Paulina Mohale on 3 December, 2010). 
 
One resident, Paulina Mohale, stated the following:  
 
I used to live in a shack in Camp 2, before we were moved into our houses. 
Living in a shack wasn’t good at all. We struggled with water leaking through 
the roof during the rainy season, and in summer the shacks really got very 
hot. The community toilets did not flush; we had to use the bucket system and 
it was not impressive at all. There was no privacy because the toilets were 
public. Everyone used the toilets. Drunken people who would leave the place 
in a terrible state also used the toilets. We had to clean up their mess. Camp 
2 wasn’t healthy at all because the water that people used for bathing was 
disposed of in the streets; the very same streets that everybody had to walk 
on. Previously we lived in Kayalami with my mother (on a plot), before we 
moved to Olieven (Olievenhoutbosch). My mother realized that shacks were 
being built in Olieven so she decided to buy a shack.  Then I moved with her. 
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It took a while for our RDP house to be built. It must have taken a period of 
five to six years (Interview with Paulina Mohale on 3 December, 2010). 
 
Officials allocating houses stated that these informal settlements were generally not 
conducive to human habitation. The lack of adequate water and sanitation created 
environments conducive to cholera outbreaks, and adverse conditions in the 
settlements affected people’s dignity (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 
2010).  However, despite these negatives, some residents reported that living under 
such difficult conditions made them survivors, tougher and with a greater ability to 
cope with life’s challenges (Interview with Margaret Mohale on 3 December, 2010).  
 
 
3.2.3 Institutional arrangements 
 
Stakeholders in the developmental process included the City of Tshwane (as 
developer with ABSA); various national and provincial government departments 
(including the Department of Public Works, the Department of Energy, the local utility 
services departments, the Department of Social Development) and Bigen Africa – a 
consulting engineering firm (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). 
ABSA Devco was the ‘turnkey contractor’16; and the informal dwellers in Choba and 
Camp 1 and 2 were the target market for the development. Interestingly, residents in 
these three informal settlements represented a variety of income groups, which 
included people who qualified for a housing subsidy; people who earned too much to 
qualify; and people who were renting informal accommodation and wished to 
continue renting in a formal environment (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 
December, 2010).  
 
Another interesting feature in OVB was that development professionals reportedly 
did not sit in their offices designing the development from afar. They visited the site 
and the community members on a regular basis (Interview with Thokozani 
                                                          
16 ‘Turnkey’ is a term commonly used in the construction sector, and is used to describe a home built 
on the developer-financed land. A ‘turnkey home’ is a home with a complete structure and finished 
interior, with everything ready for the occupant or homeowner to move in. 
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Hlatshwayo on 2 December, 2010). This was evident in the interviews, in which 
many community members knew the names of the officials working on the project.  
 
A key stakeholder, Bigen Africa, described their role as ‘facilitating development 
activism’ (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). They reportedly 
‘translated’ the different ‘languages’ of the various stakeholders in the development 
process in order to achieve improved communication and enhanced delivery. They 
stated that the developers did not know how to talk finance; the banks did not know 
how to talk development; government at times did not know how to talk development 
or finance; and no-one seemed to know how to talk to the community members 
(Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010).  Development activism was 
defined as the process of bridging language and ideological gaps between ‘knowns’ 
and ‘unknowns’ for the benefit of professional role players and community members 
(Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). 
 
Bigen Africa also assisted with legal planning, researching and negotiating 
appropriate institutional modalities, and advising government and the private sector 
on the way forward (Interview with Anton Boschoff on December 2, 2010). Their aim 
was to craft a development process for the stakeholders involved, and to deliver a 
final product for the City of Tshwane that was operationally sound, easy to manage 
and financially viable (Interviews with Anton Boschoff & Mala Harrilal on December 
2, 2010). 
 
 
3.2.4 Financing the development  
 
Prior to 2004, the City of Tshwane relied on subsidy allocations from national and 
provincial government for low-income housing provision, which reportedly prevented 
the city from delivering integrated, sustainable human settlements (Interview with 
Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). In order to improve housing delivery post-BNG, 
the city wrote a policy which resolved to provide additional top-up funding for 
improved quality of services for low-income housing developments. They also 
resolved to work in partnership with ABSA (Interviews with Anton Boschoff & Mala 
Harrilal on 2 December, 2010).  
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The Olievenhoutbosch funding model allocated financial responsibilities and risks to 
those best equipped to deal with them. For example, government was equipped to 
handle institutional risks, which were in the region of 80 – 90% of the overall 
development risk. This was significant for the private sector, which was then willing 
to accept 10 – 20% of the development risk (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 
December, 2010).  
 
As mentioned previously, all three spheres of government played a role in defining 
the design and implementation of OVB. The National Department of Housing 
(NDOH) played a custodial role in the development process. The NDOH made sure 
financial policies were in place to attract private sector investment and the required 
grant funding was passed on to the city as the developer (Interview with Mala Harrilal 
on 2 December, 2010). In the case of OVB, the city had the advantage of a top-up 
policy for additional services, which reassured the private sector that sufficient 
funding would be in place to deliver a quality product. ABSA also contributed to a 
higher level of service for OVB in order to attract bonded investors (Interview with 
Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010).  
 
Financial responsibilities were allocated to different government spheres, and to 
ABSA. The lifecycle of the project was also taken into account, with funding allocated 
to various stages of the lifecycle. These stages included: project identification, 
project definition and development, project implementation, operation and 
maintenance.  Government and ABSA Devco were responsible for capital costs, and 
local government as well as end users were responsible for operational and 
maintenance costs (Interview with Moira Marima on 2 December, 2010).  
 
Subsidy houses were funded by government and bonded houses were funded by 
ABSA Devco. Due to economies of scale, the bonded houses received benefits 
through the use of bulk services supplied for the subsidised units. ABSA Devco 
provided necessary bridging finance for government where required and carried its 
own market risk on all bonded units in the township. ABSA also provided bridging 
finance for the development due to the fact that the city budget cycle began in July 
and national and provincial governments’ budget cycles began in April, which 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
48 
 
resulted in budgetary and allocative inefficiencies. Government re-paid ABSA on 
commercial terms (Interview with Moira Marima on 2 December, 2010).  
  
Subsidies from national and provincial government (including municipal infrastructure 
grant funding) were blended with city finances and covered costs for roads, water 
provision, sewer reticulation, storm-water drainage and top structures. The city’s 
infrastructure standards were 5% higher than other municipalities. However, 
Tshwane’s unique top-up policy made additional funding available for a higher level 
of service in the beginning phase of the project (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 
December, 2010). Financial modelling purportedly revealed that the additional up-
front costs would save the city money in future (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 
December, 2010). Funding was also provided for social facilitation, beneficiary 
administration and consumer education before and after construction. However, it 
must be noted that only 2% of the development budget was allocated to these 
processes (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). It must also be noted 
that the Tshwane’s Housing Department does not have a fund for maintenance. 
Once the project was completed, the Department of Public Works maintained it. 
According to Bigen Africa, the higher quality of housing products and services 
delivered would reduce the amount of maintenance required in future (Interview with 
Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). Subsidy-housing beneficiaries were given 
one year to come back to the municipality to present any infrastructure problems 
(Interview with Moira Marima on 2 December, 2010).  
 
 
3.2.5 Tshwane’s ‘sustainable development’ process 
  
In Olievenhoutbosch, the city aimed to deliver an integrated, sustainable settlement 
by following the BNG objectives of providing a variety of housing typologies for 
mixed income and mixed racial groups; hiring and training emerging contractors; 
planning for and providing social amenities and making use of public and private 
partnerships. Additionally, Tshwane provided an improved level of infrastructure and 
utilised enhanced financial mechanisms to eradicate three informal settlements. 
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The City of Tshwane attempted to mitigate negative environmental impacts through 
the use of ecological design techniques. The project team designed north-facing 
houses, placed larger windows on the north side of buildings, utilised overhangs, 
ceilings, appropriate ventilation, and recycled and local building materials. The team 
also viewed the hiring and training of local and emerging contractors as a 
sustainable intervention. They also included the use of alternate forms of electricity 
like solar street lights and solar water heaters (Interview with Mokgosi Komane on 2 
December, 2010). The Department of Water and Forestry (DWAF provided training 
programmes on the greening aspects of development. DWAF donated fruit trees and 
taught residents how to take care of them. Project-greening activities included 
planting trees along the roads and creating natural drainage areas as well as flood-
attenuation ponds.  In this respect, “plant a tree” days were announced, and many 
residents began planting their own trees and grass at home (Interview with Mala 
Harrilal on 2 December, 2010). Amenities were located close to the residents, and 
spatial planning included local and easy-to-access schools, shopping centres, taxi 
ranks and informal trading centres (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 
2010).  
 
The process of integrated development also aimed to include the integration of 
communities in OVB. It was emphasised that learning should not come from 
government officials but that residents should learn from each other. Residents of 
various racial and socio-economic backgrounds live together in Olievenhoutbosch, 
thus breaking with the previous dispensation’s segregation of racial groups. 
 
Olievenhoutbosch also aimed to be financially sustainable for residents and council. 
Residents had a sense of ownership and an investment to protect. The council 
benefited from rates income which, in turn, made services and funds available for 
poorly remunerated families and individuals. Olievenhoutbosch was designed to 
attract investors to create a quality development with local employment 
opportunities; a ‘place to live, work and play’.  Project officials and contractors hoped 
that this integrated model of development would prevent Olievenhoutbosch from 
regressing into a future slum (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010).  
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3.2.6 Housing options and typologies 
 
According to the City of Tshwane, Olievenhoutbosch catered for subsidy housing, 
institutional rental housing (rental units and rent-to-buy units) and gap housing for 
those who qualified for bonds (Interview with Mokgosi Komane on 2 December, 
2010).  The process of allocating units was meant to be racially neutral, though 
income driven. Fully subsidised housing was provided for the poorest of the poor, 
bonded units were built for all racial groups who qualified, and social (rental) housing 
was provided for those who had access to money for monthly rental payments 
(Interview with Mokgosi Komane  on 2 December, 2010). 
 
Land ownership changed through the life cycle of the project. Originally owned by 
ABSA, the subsidised and bonded units were then handed over to beneficiaries, 
either through government or an investor. Subsidised and bonded houses were 
essentially freehold. Institutional rental housing, on the other hand, was owned by 
the Social Housing Foundation, which then made units available on a lease or rent-
to-buy basis (Interviews with Anton Boschoff and Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 
2010). 
 
Subsidised units were constructed for those who qualified 
for a housing subsidy and earned less than R3,500 a 
month. Subsidised units included free-standing houses of 
36 square metres; semi-detached houses of between 38 
and 40 square metres (see Figure 3.1) and walk-ups.  
Institutional rental housing units (in blocks of flats) were  
meant to house families earning between R3,501 and 
R7,500 a month. There were major challenges with the 
management of and income received in the rental housing 
sector. Thus this initiative did not prove very successful 
(Interview with Mokgosi Komane on 2 December, 2010). 
Bonded houses were designed for those earning  
R7,500 a month and more (see Figure 3.2),  
and were designed according to approved bond criteria and applicants’ 
specifications (Interview with Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010). 
Figure 3.2:  Gap house in 
Olievenhoutbosch  
Courtesy:  Bigen Africa 
Figure 3.1:  Semi-detached 
house in Olievenhoutbosch:  
Courtesy: Bigen Africa 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
 
 
3.2.6.1 Identification of housing beneficiaries 
 
The City of Tshwane identifies subsidy housing beneficiaries for greenfield 
developments from their database, which dates back to 1996. Theoretically, those 
who have been on the list for the longest period of time are eligible for housing 
opportunities first. The city numbers shacks and these numbers are then given to the 
Gauteng Department of Local Government and Housing for subsidy approval. 
Criteria which city officials take into account in the beneficiary selection process 
include household income levels, number of people in the household, number of 
financial dependents, and whether the applicant previously owned a house 
(Interview with Mokgosi Komane on 2 December, 2010). 
 
In Tshwane, a number of factors determine house allocations.  Elderly people who 
find it difficult to live in walk-ups are allocated ground level units, while double-story 
units are allocated to needy youth. Family size is also a determining factor. For 
example, Tshwane is reluctant to put a large family in a semi-detached house which 
cannot be expanded, and will thus allocate a free-standing house that can be 
expanded. According to Komane (Interview with Mokgosi Komane on 2 December, 
2010) a certain amount of discretion is required from housing practitioners in housing 
allocation. 
  
According to the city, the biggest challenge with beneficiary identification in OVB was 
political. Olievenhoutbosch fell within the City of Tshwane but bordered on 
Johannesburg’s metropolitan boundaries. This made it difficult to establish who 
should be included as beneficiaries. Once the politics were settled and there was a 
mandate from the political party to progress, ward committees began to contribute. It 
was then a matter of relocating the selected community members. Olievenhoutbosch 
had a large population and there was a shortage of stands. Though the City of 
Tshwane made attempts to densify the development (as reflected as in Figure 3.3), 
there were still community members who did not receive houses. 
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Figure 3.3:    Densifying Olievenhoutbosch  
Courtesy:  Bigen Africa 
 
3.2.7 Economic development  
 
Olievenhoutbosch residents intimated that business and economic opportunities had 
improved for them since moving into the development.  Paulina Mohale stated: “I 
even run my own business now and God has allowed it to grow. I’ve found a full-time 
income in Olieven. Before moving here I didn’t even run a business” (Interview with 
Paulina Mohale 3 December, 2010).  Mohale is currently expanding her garage so 
she can grow her catering business and hire staff to assist her (Interview with 
Paulina Mohale 3 December, 2010).  After moving to OVB, Gary Moodley said that 
he was inspired to study again.  He later qualified as an electrician, and bought a 
business selling electricity to community members (Interview with Gary Moodley on 3 
December, 2010). Other residents own spaza shops, hair salons, clothing stores and 
provide various other necessary services to residents (personal observation and 
interview with Mala Harrilal on 3 December, 2010).  
 
 
3.2.8 Racial and socio-economic integration 
 
Residents interviewed were Indian and African, and came from different parts of the 
country. Some reported that their own stereotypes regarding other races had been 
challenged as they spent time together in Olieven (Interview with Gary Moodley on 3 
December, 2010). It was reported that first-hand knowledge of other cultures helped 
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residents develop empathy toward one another, and there was an easing of racial 
tension over time (Interview with Gary Moodley on 3 December, 2010).  
 
Moodley (Interview with Gary Moodley on 3 December, 2010) experienced an easing 
of racial tension with white people, who came to OVB to help their employees with 
their homes and also reported that his own stereotypes of white people had been 
challenged through this experience.  He stated that many residents gained first-hand 
knowledge of other cultures through their own personal experiences – not via 
hearsay – and the experience was ranked as a positive, ‘nation-building’ exercise.  
 
Community members also reported that mixing different income groups led to 
improved relationships between them. Poor community members learned to ‘think 
bigger’, and wealthier community members gained a better understanding of the 
circumstances of the poor (Interview with Margaret Molefe on 3 December, 2010). 
 
According to Margaret Molefe: 
 
Olieven has changed.  I’m saying this because we now see each other as one 
regardless of our different languages or skin colour. There’s nobody who can 
say this one belongs to that side and this one to the other. We are united and 
building each other. Life has changed because I’ve seen white people enter 
this neighbourhood in their cars. They even enter into these houses to see 
what they can do to help. Most peoples’ bosses do come here to fix their 
houses. Things have really changed because white people accept and 
welcome us when we meet. It’s peaceful. People from Olieven love and 
accept other people; they don’t discriminate against each other. I believe this 
is a good housing project because there’s no gap between social classes. We 
were all given houses. They didn’t say this one is rich; she will therefore get 
the house. We were all given houses without discrimination (Interview with 
Margaret Molefe on 3 December, 2010). 
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3.2.9 Community responses  
 
When interviewing community members in OVB, the general consensus was that 
government was recognised as playing a positive role in the development (Interviews 
with Paulina Mohale, Margaret Molefe & Gary Moodley on 3 December, 2010). 
However, concern was expressed about how slow the process was (Mohale, 2010). 
The need for replicability was also expressed by community members. ABSA and 
Bigen Africa were recognised as major role players and were also generally 
perceived in a positive light (Interviews with Paulina Mohale, Margaret Molefe & Gary 
Moodley on 3 December, 2010).  
 
Subsidy home owners interviewed were delighted to have indoor toilets and water, 
gardens and electricity (Interviews with Paulina Mohale & Margaret Molefe on 
December 3, 2010).  They expressed gratitude to God, the government and ABSA 
(Interview with Paulina Mohale on December 3, 2010). There was also a desire to 
see others enjoy these amenities (Interview with Paulina Mohale on December 3, 
2010).  
 
Margaret Molefe stated that:  
 
I was over the moon with excitement when I was given the key to the house 
which I currently live in. I couldn’t believe that I had finally been given a 
house. I still can’t believe that I have a house of my own. I’m so excited to be 
living in this house. My life has completely changed because I don’t have to 
worry myself about water coming into my house when it rains. I now have a 
toilet inside the house, I have water and I now have a garden where I’m able 
to plant vegetables. I even have electricity. I have good neighbours and we 
are treating each other well even though there are a  few that are not so good. 
Good people surround me; we try to build each other. 
I feel alive and accepted here. People who live in the nicer houses come to 
me to discuss certain issues. I feel accepted in this community. We were 
united while we were still living in shacks but we were not as close as we are 
now. The people within our community have embraced unity; we are now a 
team. We are comfortable with each other. We all greet one another. That’s 
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how we grew to know each other; we now call each other as neighbours. We 
even know each other’s physical addresses. We’ve been able to live together 
and we build each other (Interview with Margaret Molefe on 3 December, 
2010). 
 
A few negative comments were noted, namely that houses and kitchens were 
described as small and an extra space would have been ‘nice’ (Interview with 
Margaret Molefe on 2 December, 2010).  However, one resident with a two-room 
house had already begun improving it by building backyard rooms and a small 
business (Interview with Paulina Mohale on 3 December, 2010).   
 
 
3.2.10 Monitoring and evaluation  
 
In OVB, monitoring and evaluation systems were established by Bigen Africa, and 
outputs were measured against original targets. Measurable indicators included the 
establishment of a working, institutional and financial model and the delivery of 5,000 
mixed-income, mixed-density housing opportunities.  Indicators also included the 
provision of an improved level of basic and social services, the provision of training 
and the delivery of consumer-education programmes for community members. 
Timeframes for delivery were reportedly measured and adhered to (Interview with 
Anton Boschoff on 2 December, 2010).  
 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
The main objective of officials and professionals in Olievenhoutbosch was to move 
beyond the provision of subsidy housing for the poor, and to deliver well-located, 
racially and socio-economically mixed communities with social amenities. This is 
responsive to the BNG directives of shifting from housing to sustainable human 
settlements; the use of existing and new housing instruments and support for the 
entire residential property market. Tshwane officials and other professionals 
expressed the desire to replicate the project methodology elsewhere, so more 
people could benefit (Interview with Mala Harrilal on 2 December, 2010).  
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It can be said that OVB is also responsive to the BNG instrument of redefining 
institutional arrangements within government.  The level of commitment from various 
role-players was unique, and enabled the project to finish within deadlines, and 
against targets. These role-players included Bigen Africa, the City of Tshwane, 
ABSA, provincial and national government departments (including the Department of 
Public Works), and community members. Though Public Works provided some jobs 
during the construction of the project, these jobs were fixed term. However, the 
location of the development enabled community members easier access to 
economic opportunities. Knock-on effects within the development included enabling 
residents to start and run their own businesses. 
 
When measuring the mechanism of information, communication and awareness 
building, the professional communication model in OVB was well documented. 
Officials and project leaders met regularly, defined project goals and monitored these 
goals regularly. Though community demographics were taken into account and 
community members taken through a consumer-education course, there was little 
evidence that community leaders were able to provide meaningful input in the design 
phases of the development. The fact that only 2% of the project budget was 
allocated to social and participatory development reflects the acute lack of 
participation of communities in settlement planning. 
 
Creative finance streams which mitigated risks between the various investors 
enabled the project to deliver an above-average level of service as well as improved 
quality housing options. Thus it can be argued that the restructuring of financial 
arrangements worked well in this development. Monitoring and evaluation tools were 
used which measured completed project activities against initial targets and goals.  
 
Housing and settlement practitioners should take cognisance of the methodologies 
employed in this development, notwithstanding diverse contextual challenges. For 
example, the greenfields nature of this project enabled the provision of a multiplicity 
of social services and housing typologies. However, not all developments are 
greenfields. Though the City of Tshwane (in partnership with ABSA) was able to 
provide additional funding for a higher level of services, not all municipalities have 
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the fiscal resources to accomplish this. Smaller municipalities with lower rates and 
tariff income do not have the luxury of extending a top-up finance policy, or of 
providing additional services. Additionally, project teams attempting to use an 
integrated approach could budget for and include the use of a development 
‘translator’ to act as a go-between for improved communication between 
stakeholders. The financial risk-sharing model employed in this development is also 
interesting, and other practitioners can learn from this. This model may also be 
replicable in  local authorities with the initial capital to invest. 
 
In closing, though the improved quality of units may reduce long-term maintenance 
costs, the fact that no budget has been allocated for maintenance, particularly for 
subsidy housing, is problematic, and indicative of a nation-wide trend that should be 
re-examined. It should be noted that after visiting more than a dozen ‘best practice’ 
nominated projects (some of which have not been detailed in this study), this case 
study stands out as the closest example of an integrated sustainable settlement. 
Olievenhoutbosch was chosen because there are many positive lessons that can be 
learned from it.  However, it is not a true reflection of the status of most of the other 
projects identified. The next case study, Zanemvula, is more reflective of the 
dysfunctions evident in human settlement planning and delivery in South Africa. 
 
 
3.4 Case study 2:  Port Elizabeth - Zanemvula 
 
In choosing particular case studies to showcase in this study, various criteria were 
used. Projects which were initially developed pre-BNG were not selected for in-depth 
analysis, as it became difficult to differentiate which policy objectives were followed 
in what timeframes (pre-BNG and/or post-BNG).  Projects which were deemed 
wholly ‘non-responsive’ were also not selected. Only Olievenhoutbosch and 
Witsands were deemed ‘responsive,’ and the remainder of the projects were 
‘somewhat responsive’. Zanemvula falls within the ‘somewhat responsive’ category. 
Given the fact that this project has been deemed a National Priority Project with 
support from national, provincial and local authorities and the HDA, it is interesting to 
see how this project performs and under-performs. On February 18th and 19th, and 
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again on November 4th, 2009, the author travelled to Zanemvula and met with the 
project team. An overview of this National Priority Project follows.  
 
3.4.1 Overview  
 
The Zanemvula Project is an informal settlement upgrade and a purportedly BNG 
responsive human settlement project in Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM). It 
is meant to be a cooperative project between the three spheres of government, and 
stems from a visit by former National Minister of Housing, Ms Lindiwe Sisulu. In 
October 2006, the Zanemvula Interim Business Plan (ZIBP) was approved by the 
NMBM and signed by council. In 2007, Thubelisha (now the HDA) was appointed 
Project Manager for Zanemvula, with the goal being to support and strengthen the 
implementation delivery capacity of the NMBM. The project follows the NNBM 
sustainable community planning methodology (NMBM, 2007a).  
 
The project aims to adhere to the BNG principles of integration, of redefining 
institutional arrangements within and between government departments and of 
communication and awareness building (NMBM, 2006:3-52). It also aims to utilise 
collaborative funding and financing mechanisms (NMBM, 2006:42-44). It attempts to 
improve institutional support via partnerships with Thubelisha and the HDA. It also 
attempts to enhance sustainable settlement delivery and support for the entire 
residential housing market through the provision of a variety of housing typologies 
and tenure options (NMBM, 2006:14-17). The project aims to promote job creation 
and poverty alleviation through training, monitoring and reporting (NMBM, 2006:34 –
36).  
  
The ZIBP states that Zanemvula aims to be:  
 
An integrated and sustainable community living in environments that have 
access to economic opportunities, a variety of affordable and secure housing 
and tenure options, reliable and affordable basic services, educational, 
entertainment and cultural activities, as well as health, welfare and police 
services (NMBM, 2006:3). 
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Zanemvula involves the relocation of families 
from the Chatty River flood plain (see Figures 
3.4 and 3.5), to serviced sites in Chatty and Joe 
Slovo West. It also involves the servicing of 
greenfield reception areas; the de-densification 
and improvement of source areas of Soweto-
on-Sea and Veeplaas; the rectification of storm-
damaged, defective housing and the upgrading 
of certain informal settlement areas within the 
project boundaries (NMBM, 2006:3). Thus the 
project entails informal settlement upgrading as well as greenfield development. In 
this project, informal settlement upgrading entails the establishment of Temporary 
Relocation Areas (TRAs) for families that must be moved out of flood plain areas in 
the Greater Soweto-on-Sea area; de-densification and house rectifications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5:  Development Plan, Zanemvula  
Courtesy:   Jacko McCarthy 
 
This project aimed to construct 14,401 houses 
between 2006 and 2008 (NMBM, 2006:6).  The 
NMBM had already provided some subsidised 
housing opportunities at the time of the site visit (see 
Figure 3.6).  Houses are 40 square metres in size, 
with 2 private bedrooms, a bathroom with 
shower/bath and sink, tiled roof, ceilings, hardwood 
Figure 3.4:  Chatty River flood plain 
Courtesy:   Jacko McCarthy 
Figure 3.6:   Subsidy housing in 
Zanemvula 
Courtesy:   Lisa Thompson 
Smeddle 
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frames and doors, electricity, waterborne sewerage, electricity, metered water and 
1,263 houses have solar-water heating units (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 
February, 2009 and with Steyn van der Merwe on 4 November, 2009). The 
Zanemvula Project Implementation Plan aims to provide for mixed-housing 
opportunities in terms of types and densities, the use of various housing instruments, 
funding opportunities and tenure options. Roads and stormwater were also designed 
to full standard (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). However, the 
initial targets for this project have not been met. This will be explored further below. 
 
 
3.4.2 Institutional arrangements 
 
According to the ZPIP, the institutional arrangements were initially structured as 
follows (NMBM, 2007b:17): 
 
(i) A Project Steering Committee with representatives from the HDA, the three 
spheres of government, wards councillors, ward committee members, and 
government sector departments. This committee meets monthly; 
(ii) A Zanemvula Implementation Agreement which specifies roles and 
responsibilities for  all  role players; 
(iii) A Technical Task Team which also meets monthly; 
(iv) A Development Forum which consists of ward councillors and ward committee 
members, community leaders and technical representatives. This forum serves 
as the main platform for community participation in the development planning 
processes; 
(v) The NMBM Special Programmes Unit which holds the institutional responsibility 
for the project at municipal level; 
(vi) Thubelisha (now the HDA) was appointed as the Implementing Agent and 
Project Manager under the terms of a formal Memorandum of Agreement 
(MoA) (signed in 2007). 
 
In Zanemvula, monthly meetings are held in local wards, and both the councillors 
and the ward committee members reportedly participate in project steering and 
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development forum meetings (Interview with Alfred Booi on 5 November, 2009). In 
these meetings issues arising in both the greenfield developments and the reception 
areas are tabled (Interview with Alfred Booi on 5 November, 2009). In Soweto-on-
Sea, major re-planning is necessary as much of Soweto-on-Sea sits on a flood plain. 
Councillors and officials have reportedly been effective in bringing community needs 
to forum meetings and in communicating to their respective communities what has 
been discussed within the meetings. Monthly progress reports are also presented 
within project steering committee meetings (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 
February, 2009). Progress report results are then distributed to constituents via ward 
councillors and ward committee representatives (Interview with Pumla Dwane on 5 
November, 2009).  
 
Though the steering committees seem committed and meet regularly, provincial 
government departments (such as health, safety and security, education) have little 
involvement in the project. The private sector was approached to support the 
development of bonded housing units, but to date the private sector has not provided 
support for the development (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). 
Other role players meant to provide support were the National Home Builders 
Registration Council (NHBRC) and the communications department within the 
National Department of Housing. Though the NHBRC was meant to evaluate the 
status of the project, to take part in regular progress meetings, monitor home 
builders, and provide training, their input has been disappointing (Interview with 
Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009; NMBM, 2006:35-37).  The NHBRC did not 
deliver on their promise to provide builders with training and similarly the 
communication department reportedly did little to drive the project. Of the long list of 
interventions contained in the over eight pages of the implementation plan, none 
were implemented.  According to McCarthy (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 
February, 2009) the only time the project team had any contact with the National 
Department was during a handover by the Minister of Housing, and even then the 
department’s input was negligible. 
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3.4.3 Financing the development  
 
Zanemvula currently utilises subsidy allocations from National Treasury and 
provincial government to deliver subsidy housing. The ZIBP promotes the 
development of a variety of housing typologies and tenure options, and suggests that 
banks will be invited to tender on mixed-housing options (NMBM, 2006:26). 
However, to date no financial provision has been made for the financing of these 
options, either from the public or private sectors (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 
19 February, 2009). Though the ZIBP suggests that the Departments of Health, 
Safety and Security, Social Development and Education will provide funding for 
social services, to date no social services have been provided, and these 
departments claim that they have no funding available for Zanemvula (Interview with 
Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). Though a policing forum is also in place, the 
Chatty area is at the moment serviced by the Bethelsdorp Police Station which is 
some distance from where most residents reside. This is because funding has not 
been allocated to build a police station nearby (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 
February, 2009). It is therefore not surprising that residents report high rates of crime 
and a lack of trust in existing policing services (Interview with Noluthando Makanda 
on 5 November, 2009). 
 
On a positive note, the NMBM has set aside funding to build a sport field in Chatty, 
and the province has approved R14,450,603 to build a multipurpose community 
centre in Soweto-on-Sea. The Department of Education is providing some subsidies 
to transport children to schools in adjacent areas, but the reality is that long travel 
distances frequently prevent these children from taking the bus and going to school 
(Interview with Pumla Dwane on 5 November, 2009). McCarthy points out quite 
rightly: ‘I can probably get donor funding from someone to build a school, but if the 
Department of Education does not engage with the project, I will have no teachers to 
staff the school’ (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). 
 
The lack of funding and of collaborative planning with provincial departments (which 
are the custodians of education, health, and other social services), are reflective of 
many other projects around the country. In the case of Zanemvula, the lack of 
cooperation in financing this development compromises the integrity of the principles 
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enshrined in the NMBM Sustainable Community Planning documents (which 
informed the planning of both Joe Slovo West and Chatty 5, 12 and 13). Although 
general plans have been laid out to make provision for bonded and rental 
accommodation, for schools, clinics, police stations and necessary social services 
within a 2km radius of every resident, the reality is that these sites are undeveloped, 
and in essence only provide space for squatters moving in (Interview with Jacko 
McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). Additionally, the private sector is not interested in 
investing in under-resourced areas where the residents are mostly poor and 
unemployed.  In the case of Zanemvula, the banks have taken particular issue with 
the lack of tarred roads, and this has inhibited investment (Interview with Jacko 
McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). Though the project was meant to receive a priority 
project budget of R1 billion over three years, none of this money materialised.  
 
Settlement delivery is also impeded by a dispute between Thubelisha and the HDA. 
When the handover of Thubelisha to the HDA occurred, Thubelisha refused to 
transfer the existing project budget to the HDA. This budget had been allocated to 
contractors to build houses. This led to only 10 houses being built per month, as 
opposed to the planned 300 (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009).  
 
 
3.4.4 Other ‘sustainable development’ interventions 
 
Though alternate and sustainable development technologies did not feature in the 
original planning documents for Zanemvula, an attempt was made by the project 
team to include the use of alternative building materials and solar water heaters in 
the development. The following sections explore attempted ‘sustainable 
development’ interventions within Zanemvula.  
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
64 
 
3.4.4.1  Alternative building materials  
 
The ZIBP does not mention the use of alternative or sustainable technological 
interventions.  However, McCarthy advised that an ‘alternative’ structure consisting 
of polystyrene and wire was erected with provincial government approval. This 
structure was meant to showcase alternative building materials. However, it was 
erected in the flood plain, and after it was built inclement weather and flooding 
caused damage to the structure, rendering it un-useable as a show house. The use 
of alternative, ‘sustainable’ construction materials and technologies on the flood plain 
caused residents to demand brick and mortar houses (Interview with Jacko 
McCarthy on 19 February, 2009).  
 
 
3.4.4.2  Solar water heating 
 
In 2009 Steyn van der Merwe, an official in the NMBM Department of Electricity and 
Energy, secured funding for a solar water heater pilot in Zanemvula. Interestingly, 
van der Merwe made provision in his budget for social surveys and for ongoing 
social evaluations of this pilot’s impact on the community. The aim of these surveys 
was to measure and assess the social impact of solar water heating in low-income 
communities, and to assist the municipality in assessing ongoing maintenance 
requirements. Van der Merwe’s pilot led to the installation of 1,263 solar water 
heating systems, which were funded by the Electricity and Energy Directorate 
(Interview with Steyn Van der Merwe on 4 November, 2009).   
 
 
3.4.5 Housing typologies and options 
 
Of the projected 2,287 houses that should have been completed in Chatty 3 and 4 in 
2008/9, none have been erected. Of the projected 328 houses planned for Chatty 5, 
none have been erected. According to the project team, the lack of skilled 
contractors and the sharp increase in costs of building materials have impeded 
delivery (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009). In Chatty 12, 13 and 
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15, 1,000 free-standing subsidy houses (of the projected 4,228) have been 
completed; 228 are nearly complete and the remaining 3,000 are meant to be 
completed by the end of 2011 (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 
2009). Construction of the proposed 4,000 houses in Joe Slovo West will only 
commence in 2010/2011. This contrasts sharply with the initial projections that made 
provision for 800 houses to be erected in 2008/2009 and the remainder in 2010 
(Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009).  
 
In the planning phases, 323 rental units were planned for Vista and Chatty 12 
(NMBM, 2006:17).  McCarthy confirmed that no rental accommodation has been 
constructed to date. Furthermore, the HDA conducted a study to quantify the 
affordability of rental housing (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 19 February, 2009).  
It can be argued that rental stock appeals to renters because of its desirable 
location, i.e. close proximity to job opportunities, amenities and public transport. 
Given the fact that Zanemvula is located far from economic opportunities and 
amenities, and the cost of transport to economic centres is high, this begs the 
question whether rental accommodation is appropriate in Zanemvula. 
 
 
3.4.5.1  Informal settlement upgrades 
 
With reference to Zanemvula’s progress against initial targets established in the 
ZIBP, households designated to be transferred to temporary relocation areas were 
not transferred (NMBM, 2006:17). The municipality claimed that it was too expensive 
to provide temporary structures; thus it supported the transfer of shacks to ‘serviced 
sites’. In reality, the services were far away and at times inaccessible to relocated 
shacks (Interview with Noluthando Makanda on 5 November, 2009). Raw sewerage 
continues to flow in the relocation areas, which has detrimental health and 
environmental implications, particularly given the fact that much of the project is 
located in and around natural wetlands, which act as receptacles for and conduits of 
water-borne disease (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on February 19, 2009).  Both 
the informal settlement upgrading and the house-rectification programme are 
dependent on the municipality finalising the township plans in these areas, which to 
date still await finalisation. The planning process has been complicated by the high 
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level of encroachments that necessitated continuous re-planning. Due to extensive 
re-planning processes, construction of only the first 865 houses is on schedule. The 
bulk of the construction was pushed out to 2012 (Interview with Jacko McCarthy on 
19 February, 2009).  
 
 
3.4.5.2  House rectifications 
 
In turn, the development of the greenfield areas and house-rectification processes 
(also laid out in the NMBM planning documents) are impeded by inaccurate budget 
calculations and by the uneven quality of work done by contractors. According to 
McCarthy, in 2002 the NMBM began to demand larger houses (40 square metre) 
which would afford residents more privacy. However, subsidy allocations were 
calculated using a 28 square metre cost measure. Unsurprisingly, contractors who 
tendered on contracts prior to 2002 using the 28 square metre subsidy calculations, 
could not complete the houses according to the new specifications. Thus many 
houses inherited by the project team were labelled ‘sub-standard’ and required 
rectification. Moreover, the original projections for house rectifications were 
increased from 460 to 2,025 and these are reportedly on schedule (Interview with 
Anele Ngwekazi on 4 November, 2009).  
 
According to Ngwekazi, house rectifications should occur once the original builder 
has been prosecuted. However, most of the contractors in question were emerging 
contractors who could not afford to pay the additional costs associated with building 
larger houses. Most of these contractors are now untraceable (Interview with Anele 
Ngwekazi on 4 November, 2009). Ngwekazi, a female builder in charge of the 
rectification programme, also advised that the process is hampered by contractors 
who begin building, but only return intermittently or stop coming to the site altogether 
(Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 November, 2009).  Additionally, the 
cumbersome co-ordination of project approvals, procurement and contractual 
appointments pushed project dates beyond deadlines. The knock-on effect was that 
fixed-cost budget allocations were not in line with inflation or cost increases 
(Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 November, 2009).  
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A further problem in Zanemvula is that when flood plain residents move into formal, 
subsidised housing, new squatters quickly move in to take their place, thinking that 
government will come to their aid if they live in these hazardous conditions. Actions 
to prevent re-invasion have not been successful (Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 
November, 2009). 
 
 
3.4.6 Economic development 
 
Zanemvula is far from economic nodes and there are currently no strategies in place 
for local economic development. 
 
 
3.4.7 Monitoring and evaluation  
 
The evaluation plan identified by the Zanemvula project team consisted of measuring 
the number of units delivered, within allocated budgets and timeframes, then 
comparing these results with initial targets. The same system was used to measure 
house rectifications and in-situ upgrade processes. The Zanemvula team was unable 
to identify a monitoring system which tracked project processes over time. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
To a certain extent, the Zanemvula project addresses the need for cooperative 
planning and improved institutional design through the establishment of steering 
committee and a development forum.  These could potentially serve as reasonably 
effective mechanisms for communicating project needs between community 
members and government, and vice versa. However, national and provincial 
government agencies have not adequately participated in these collaborative 
processes.  
 
The ZIBP ambitiously aims to acquire funding from several partners, per the BNG 
requirement. In reality, however, the DOH, the NHBRC, and provincial government 
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departments which should provide necessary funding and capacity for multiple 
housing options, training and social services are failing to provide necessary 
financial assistance.  These bodies also fail, for that matter, to engage in any form of 
collaboration. Though institutional support is provided in the establishment of 
committees and forums, and though the NMBM has provided both financial support 
and additional technical capacity, this has not been enough to successfully 
implement a project of this size against BNG and ZIBP targets and objectives. 
 
The ZIBP lists several design and implementation processes which would, ideally, 
take the project from a dormitory housing development to a sustainable human 
settlement. However, none of these plans have been implemented. The project 
consists of free-standing subsidised houses. Though these houses appear to be of 
very good quality, there are no other tenure options or housing typologies available 
in Zanemvula, and the housing needs of the communities are not being provided for. 
Though participation does occur through the various committees, there are in excess 
of 14,000 people to be housed in this project, and the HDA has hired one social-
development facilitator to serve the entire community. 
 
Zanemvula is approximately a 30-minute drive from the nearest economic hub.  
Transportation to shops and jobs is available via taxis for those who can afford them. 
The impact of transportation costs on this poor community severely reduces the 
disposable income of community members (Interview with Noluthando Makanda on 
November 5, 2009). The unemployment rate in Zanemvula is high, and there is no 
identifiable support for micro-enterprises and informal employment (Interview with 
Alfred Booi on November 5, 2009). The only visible commercial activities are spaza 
shops and shebeens (personal observations during site visits). 
 
Shacks are also located in extremely hazardous conditions. Though the NMBM and 
the HDA do make concerted efforts to relocate these shacks and to build quality 
houses, there are no effective measures in place to prevent re-invasion. Solid waste 
is apparently collected intermittently in the formal areas, but rarely in the informal 
areas. Ngwekazi advised that she has never seen a garbage truck in the entire 
development (Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 November, 2009). Wastewater is 
treated in subsidised houses but informal households do not have proper access to 
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sanitation. Water is reticulated to all subsidised households in Zanemvula but is only 
available in informal areas via communal taps (Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 
November, 2009). 
  
On a positive note, subsidy home owners seem pleased with their houses, which are 
visibly well-constructed from brick and mortar; with aprons, fascia boards and 
ceilings (Interviews with Alfred Booi, Pumla Dwane and Noluthando Makanda on 5 
November, 2009). The families that received solar water heaters are exceptionally 
happy, and it has made an enormous difference to the quality of their lives 
(Interviews with Alfred Booi, Pumla Dwane and Noluthando Makanda on 5 
November, 2009).  
 
Particularly distressing to the researcher, however, was the state of the houses 
needing rectification, and Ngwekazi’s ongoing battle to ensure that contractors return 
to the site to honour their contracts by completing their building projects. In some 
cases, contractors would lay the slabs because that was the most lucrative part of 
the contract, collect payment and then abscond (Interview with Anele Ngwekazi on 4 
November, 2009). 
 
In closing, the short-sightedness of government’s practice of delivering dormitory 
houses without tying in funding for required social infrastructure (including access to 
affordable public transport systems) is clearly spotlighted in this development. 
Subsidy houses are all free standing and shacks reappear on sites that have been 
designated for social infrastructure. The planning department of the NMBM ensured 
that the general plans made adequate provision for the spread of amenities as 
required in terms of BNG and within the principles established by the NMBM 
sustainable community unit. Unfortunately, the lack of collaboration between 
government departments, the inability of provincial agents to tie in funding with local 
government planning and the private sector’s unresponsiveness to assisting the poor 
have made this National Priority Project a showcase of bad practice in South Africa. 
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Chapter 4:  Research Findings and Core Lessons 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the main findings and conclusions of the research are consolidated. 
Core challenges are re-visited, suggestions on possible interventions which may 
promote more effective and more sustainable settlement delivery are proffered, as 
are concluding remarks.  
 
In concluding this study, the researcher would like to return to a few comments and 
statements which surfaced while exploring the Zanemvula project, which resonated 
in many other parts of the country. In the Zanemvula Project Implementation Plan 
the vision of the Project is recorded as: 
 
An integrated and sustainable community living in environments that have 
access to economic opportunities, a variety of affordable and secure housing 
and tenure options, reliable and affordable basic services, educational, 
entertainment and cultural activities as well as to health, welfare and police 
services. It is recorded that all parties recognise this vision (NMBM, 2007b:3). 
 
On 15 August 2008, former Minister of Housing Lindiwe Sisulu came to Zanemvula 
to hand over houses.  She stated: 
 
I am glad that we are finally making headway in the Zanemvula Housing 
Project and I am glad that the people who will be housed in Zanemvula are 
finally benefiting after such a long wait. It is worth mentioning, especially for 
the benefit of the new MEC, that the people of this area have been the most 
cooperative and supportive of government initiatives I have come across. 
They have embraced the Zanemvula Housing Project and made it their own 
(Sisulu, 2008). 
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On 19 February 2009, a community member who wished to remain anonymous 
stated the following: 
 
The government said they would give us houses. We used to have hope that 
we would be able to find work, send our kids to school, and walk to a clinic. 
We still have nothing. No house, no school, no clinic.  We have lost our hope. 
 
In her book, Fiona Ross suggests that though informal settlements and townships 
across South Africa differ in many respects, but “What residents do have in common, 
for the most part, is that they are poor, and utterly exposed to the rawness of life” 
(Ross, 2007:7). 
 
In this exposé of life in ‘the bush,’ which is to say a shack settlement on the outskirts 
of Cape Town, Ross’s story of living in an informal settlement could be the story of 
thousands – perhaps even millions – across South Africa. The daily life in informal 
settlements and townships is unpredictable. Many residents are unemployed or 
under-employed, often living in areas without water, sanitation, waste removal or 
permanent housing. Separated by the apartheid government, and arguably 
abandoned by the post-apartheid state, they attempt to eke out a living with what 
meagre portions they can collect on a day-to-day basis.  In the attempt to provide 
housing and services, it is this picture that is lost.  This is the picture that needs to be 
reviewed by government and the private sector. 
 
 
4.2 Collaboration, integration and fragmentation 
 
With few exceptions, government spheres and institutions continue to be fragmented 
and dysfunctional, unable to collaborate, and unable to clearly define roles and lines 
of authority. Of all government spheres, local government is arguably uniquely 
positioned to manage and implement developmental solutions for their constituents 
(Christmas & De Visser, 2009). Alas, administrative changes and the amalgamation 
of local government systems and structures have been contributing factors to the 
inability of South African local authorities to play a meaningful role. Local authorities 
are exceptionally strained and in need of skilled human capacity (Lawless, 2007; 
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National Treasury, 2008; Gwabeni et al., 2008; DBSA, 2009). Couple this with 
inherited service-delivery backlogs from previous administrations (Christmas & De 
Visser, 2009), and local government has indeed a monumental task ahead.  
 
It is clear to the researcher that though the IDP processes are meant to integrate city 
development and enhance social participation, most municipalities visited seem to 
lack the capacity to effectively implement their IDP. Participation in IDP processes is 
often limited to the presentation of IDP project and programme results for public 
comment, after it has been written (UN Habitat, 2009:63).  
 
 
4.3 Fiscal constraints  
 
The core challenge that has faced local authorities since 1994 has been how to find 
fiscally viable ways to expand services into poorer areas while maintaining and 
operating income-generating services for the city as a whole. The tension between 
equity and cost recovery continues to bedevil service delivery praxis in cities and 
provinces. Energy, water, sanitation and waste departments aspire to achieve cost 
recovery, whilst attempting to provide services for the poor. Equitable share 
allocations, and in rare cases top-up funding derived from rates, tariffs and land 
sales are not enough to provide services for an ever-burgeoning population 
(Interview with Barry Coetzee on November 6, 2009). Furthermore, it is one thing to 
extend infrastructure using capital budgets and transfers. It is a completely different 
matter to make sure that operating budgets are expanded accordingly to maintain 
and repair this infrastructure into the future. Provision should be made in capital 
budgets for refurbishment and upgrade, particularly for bulk infrastructure. It is my 
belief that as long as capital-expenditure budgets are used to extend basic services 
to the poor (as they should) without investing in refurbishing  existing infrastructure, 
pressures on operating budgets to maintain  collapsing infrastructure will relentlessly 
continue with, inevitably, diminishing returns. Then there is the requirement of trying 
to house the ever-increasing number of poor migrating to urban areas. 
 
Though the South African government has arguably supplied more houses to its 
constituents than any other nation, housing provision is not aligned with other local 
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government line departments like water, sanitation, energy, electricity or waste 
(GCIS, 2010:308).  This is largely due to the complicated manner in which housing is 
delivered. Instead of local government departments having full authority to deliver 
housing and basic services,  convoluted systems and financial flows from national to 
provincial and local government slow down and often halt delivery altogether. This is 
not to say that provinces do not have a role to play in the development of sustainable 
settlements. It is important to have oversight bodies that can provide support and 
encourage accountability in all areas of service delivery. However, these roles 
should be allocated in a manner that enables effective delivery rather than hindering 
it.  
 
Arguably, a step in the direction toward delivering integrated settlements would be 
the alignment of provincial and local government budget cycles. Another suggestion 
would be to re-define or to streamline overlapping provincial and local government 
functions that sow confusion and undermine effective delivery. If, for example, 
provincial government maintained its role as the provider of social services, whilst 
handing over the authority of housing delivery to local government in an incremental 
(and incrementally hands-off) manner, while concurrently building capacity within 
local government, the delivery of sustainable settlements could potentially move in 
the right direction. Provincial officials in the housing function could also be allocated 
positions in local government, where their experience might be invaluable. 
 
On a fiscal level, limited state resources and the limited interest of private sector 
financiers in low-income developments continues to underpin subsidy-only housing 
settlement delivery. Private sector incentives and protection should be explored for 
financial institutions, beyond expecting them to invest in the low-income sector 
because of some moral obligation.  
 
According to Hoek-Smit (2009), the ‘real’ cost of a subsidy house is near R135,000. 
This is far beyond the current state subsidy allocation to provinces.  It can be argued 
that there is a dominance of ownership-driven responses in South Africa, which has 
fixed government’s attention (on the delivery of bonded housing options). Rental 
accommodation and subsidised rental accommodation are under-developed. Given 
the fact that less than 100,000 subsidies of R2.5 million have been allocated to rental 
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housing and given the need for backyard shacks and other forms of rental 
accommodation in South Africa, social housing models which provide affordable 
housing types for various income groups should be further explored and funded 
(Hoek-Smit, 2009). 
 
 
4.4 Re-building capacity 
 
Though capacity constraints continue to bedevil local authorities, the IDP mechanism 
is arguably still one of the most advanced and sophisticated methods for planning 
cities and distributing services and resources. Through accredited capacity-building 
programmes, local authorities can come to grips with the intention of integrated 
development planning, and learn to work with communities in the development of 
future social-spatial and economic nodes and strategies. 
 
It could also be suggested that training in advocacy, lobbying, managing community 
processes and community finance for civil society organisations (like the Federation 
of the Urban Poor and Shack Dwellers International)  may serve to build stronger 
partnerships with government and to create higher success rates in housing delivery. 
Moreover, the presence of informed communities and well-organised civil society 
organisations may enable long term, sustainable community participation to occur. 
Mechanisms for previously and currently marginalized groups could be established 
for these communities to have a voice in participatory planning processes. 
 
 
4.5 Shifting to sustainable human settlements?   
 
Though the Department of Human Settlements has delivered upwards of 1,3 million 
houses between 2004 and the end of March, 2009 (providing shelter for 7,5 million 
people) the Department has not achieved its overall objective of implementing 
integrated, sustainable human settlements in South  Africa (GCIS, 2010:308). The 
principle of well-located settlements with access to services and economic activities 
for the poor is a central feature of sustainable human settlement development within 
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BNG. However, the lack of available, affordable inner-city land for low-income 
housing continues to marginalise the poor.  
 
Other challenges identified include the need to address the harrowing effects of 
peripheralisation which include distance to place of employment and low levels of 
community integration. Planning and zoning restrictions can also be problematic, 
particularly in dense shack settlements where shacks are built extremely close to 
one another. Subsidy housing in its current form is also unnecessarily expensive. All 
of these challenges inhibit the progress toward sustainable human settlement 
delivery. 
 
 
4.6 The non-use of existing and new housing instruments 
 
In reviewing recent progress against BNGs objectives, it is clear that not much has 
changed from the previous policy dispensation. Though subsidy bands have been 
collapsed and new subsidy allocations are theoretically available, free-standing 
subsidy housing continues to dominate the delivery agenda. PHP processes are not 
working; civil society is not able to assist in reducing backlogs and communities are 
not capacitated to apply concerted pressure on government to change their praxis. 
 
According to the UN Habitat Global Report on Human Settlements (UN Habitat, 
2009:94), in order to ensure that citizen participation in urban planning is meaningful, 
a number of minimum conditions must be in place.  These include political structures 
which allow and encourage active citizen participation; the establishment of a legal 
framework for local planning; the need for policies which specify that participatory 
processes must be allowed to influence planning and decision-making; and the 
establishment of mechanisms for socially marginalised groups to have a voice. 
 
In order for these processes to be effective, the ‘need for speed’ mode of delivery 
must be challenged. UN Habitat (UN Habitat, 2009:164) states that governments 
need to acknowledge that programmes that focus only on the delivery of quantities of 
peripheral, low-density housing are doomed to fail. Housing delivery must be 
combined with community development, capacity-building, job creation, 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
76 
 
empowerment, and the provision of services. If these mechanisms are employed, 
participatory housing delivery frameworks will be better equipped to influence the 
physical and spatial characteristics of cities. 
 
The UN Habitat (UN Habitat, 2009:105) report also states that participatory 
processes have the potential to achieve the following positive outcomes:  
 
 Joint identification of needs and priorities can lead to improved coordination of 
efforts and acceptance of outcomes amongst stakeholders even given 
resource restrictions;  
 
 Local needs and priorities can be identified through processes involving wide 
stakeholder consultation. This is particularly important in assisting previously 
marginalised communities to vocalise and champion their needs and 
priorities. 
 
 
4.7 Are we supporting the entire residential property market?  
 
In response to the BNG directive to provide various tenure options, DHS continues to 
provide subsidies for no- and low-income earners using a variety of subsidy and loan 
mechanisms. However, the dominant feature in housing delivery continues to be the 
roll out of single, free-standing subsidy units. As previously mentioned, 
comparatively few developments include social/rental housing units, or densified 
options, and banks continue to view gap housing as high risk. 
 
In proposing possible remedies to this pervasive problem, Hoek-Smit (2009) argues 
that finance should be extended to credit-worthy low- and middle-income families 
who have been traditionally excluded from the credit market. Coupled to this, 
government could subsidise insurance for low-income bonds, which would cover 
bond repayments if the borrower were to lose a job, become ill or be unable to pay 
for a period of time (Hoek-Smit, 2009). Government could also subsidise the 
transaction costs that banks incur, which low- and middle-income earners may not 
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be able to afford. This would enable these income earners to enter the bond market 
(Hoek-Smit, 2009). Another suggestion might be to offer fixed-rate premiums to low- 
and middle-income earners, who are less able to absorb shocks in the economy.   
 
 
4.8 Is housing a job creation and poverty alleviation strategy?  
 
Officials across the country view job-creation strategies and poverty alleviation 
strategies in different ways. Some view them in terms of locating settlements as 
close to jobs and economic hubs as fiscally and spatially possible. Others promote 
the establishment of local community centres which can create jobs and generate 
income. A few link housing delivery to job creation through EPWP programmes and 
the upliftment and support of local emerging contractors.  
 
Sadly, these are proposed in a national economic policy context which has failed to 
significantly reduce unemployment, or increase income levels of poor and working 
class households. To make matters worse, if low-level wages do not keep up with 
inflation, municipal investments in the extension of basic services to the poor will not 
be recovered. In other words, if South Africa’s economic growth path depends on 
cheap labour, municipalities’ access to households that can pay rates for services 
will be undermined.  Alternatively, this can also result in burgeoning, un-serviced 
informal settlements.  
 
 
4.9 The need to establish and enforce monitoring and evaluation systems  
 
The challenges related to the monitoring and evaluation of settlements and 
settlement delivery are as worrying as fiscal and human resource incapacity. Though 
the Municipal Finance Management Act (RSA, 2003) requires strict reporting against 
financial indicators, most municipalities surveyed and visited do not have relevant or 
extensive monitoring and evaluation programmes in place to measure against policy 
targets. In fact, the researcher found that, when asked about monitoring and 
evaluation systems, most project teams responded that they simply measure against 
the number of units delivered within a particular budget and timeframe. Though 
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monitoring and evaluation is a foundational principle in BNG, the Monitoring, 
Evaluation and Impact Assessment (MEIA) Policy and Implementation Framework 
was only established in 2009 in the housing sector. Thus prior to 2009 there were 
few measures in place to hold provinces and municipalities accountable to 
established goals and directives. This is a critical area which must be addressed if 
transparency and accountability are to be achieved in settlement delivery. 
 
In closing, extensive interviews with role-players, including individuals, the private 
sector and government departments arguably lead to the conclusion that very little 
progress has been made since 2004 with regard to the delivery of sustainable 
human settlements. The 10-year review highlighted the lack of necessary support 
and funding for local government to successfully execute what was required of them. 
It is evident that support and funding are still lacking. The misalignment of budget 
cycles and processes within national, provincial and local government spheres 
continues to undermine delivery in projects around the country.  The lack of capacity 
within local government to successfully implement their new developmental role in 
settlement planning and delivery is also still evident.  
 
Though Olievenhoutbosch can arguably be deemed a best practice project, and 
though lessons can be learned from this project, it is an isolated example. 
Olievenhoutbosch’s institutional arrangements, financing mechanisms, participatory 
strategies and other project processes are not reflective of project processes and 
procedures around the country.  Zanemvula, on the other hand, is more reflective of 
the disconnect between policy and practice, and of dysfunctional state systems and 
responses. Though Zanemvula is a National Priority Project, it still fails to meet the 
needs of communities, the aims of BNG and the adopted objectives in the NMBM 
sustainable communities documents. Other projects reflected, to varying degrees, 
fragmented, uncoordinated and unsuccessful attempts to deliver sustainable BNG 
settlements.  If we are making the same mistakes in this second decade of our 
democracy, we should go back to the drawing board.  
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Responses. Administered by Lisa Thompson-Smeddle, Sustainability Institute, July, 
2009. 
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Northwest  
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Thompson-Smeddle, Sustainability Institute, July, 2009. 
 
Leshoe, Phenyo.  2009. Project Manager, Department of Developmental Local 
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2009. 
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Administered by Lisa Thompson-Smeddle, Sustainability Institute, July, 2009. 
 
Mokoma, Neo. 2009. Project Manager, Department of Developmental Local 
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effectiveness and challenges in implementing BNG’s Programmatic Responses. 
Administered by Lisa Thompson-Smeddle, Sustainability Institute, July, 2009. 
 
Western Cape 
 
Daniels, Lauren. 2009. Department of Housing: New Housing, City Of Cape Town. 
Survey on the effectiveness and challenges in implementing BNG’s Programmatic 
Responses. Administered by Lisa Thompson-Smeddle, Sustainability Institute, July, 
2009. 
 
Gutas, Thembani. 2009. Corporate Services, Oudtshoorn. Survey on the 
effectiveness and challenges in implementing BNG’s Programmatic Responses. 
Administered by Lisa Thompson-Smeddle, Sustainability Institute, July, 2009. 
 
Rautenbach, Alexis. July, 2009. Deputy Director, Capacity-Building, Provincial 
Government Western Cape. Survey on the effectiveness and challenges in 
implementing BNG’s Programmatic Responses. Administered by Lisa Thompson-
Smeddle, Sustainability Institute. 
 
Wentzel, Bernardus.  2009. Senior Professional Officer, Housing Department: New 
Housing, City of Cape Town. Survey on the effectiveness and challenges in 
implementing BNG’s Programmatic Responses. Administered by Lisa Thompson-
Smeddle, Sustainability Institute, July, 2009. 
 
Williams, Derrick. 2009. Project Implementation Manager, Development Services, 
City of Cape Town. Survey on the effectiveness and challenges in implementing 
BNG’s Programmatic Responses. Administered by Lisa Thompson-Smeddle, 
Sustainability Institute, July, 2009. 
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Site Visit Interviews  
 
Grassland Interviews in Bloemfontein (Free State) 
 
Dibeco, A. 2009. Interview with Adelina Dibeco, Manager Help the Helpless 
Multipurpose Community Centre on March 31, 2009. 
 
Maboya, M. 2009. Interview with Mamiki Maboya: Director Cooperative Governance, 
Traditional Affairs and Human Settlements, Provincial Government Free State on 
March 31, 2009. 
 
Masike, J. 2009. Interview with Jackie Masike, Priority Project Manager, Free State 
Provincial Department of Local Government and Housing on March 31, 2009. 
 
Mojaki, O. 2009. Interview with Olebogeng Mojaki, Strategic Housing Planner 
Manguang Municipality on March 31, 2009. 
 
Somiah, C. 2009. Interview with Caren Somiah, Director of Free State Capacity-
Building on March 31, 2009. 
 
Klarinet Interviews in Emalaheni (Mpumalanga) 
 
Appasamy, L. 2009. Interview with Logan Appasamy, Capacity-Building, 
Mpumalanga Department of Local Government and Housing on June 30, 2009. 
 
Ballinah, M. 2009. Interview with Mojapelo Ballinah, Chief Director Housing and 
Technical Services, Mpumalanga Department of Local Government and Housing on 
June 30, 2009. 
 
Cheriyan, K. 2009. Interview with Koshy Cheriyan, Klarinet Project Engineer, 
Mpumalanga Department of Local Government and Housing on June 30, 2009. 
 
Mtsweni, V. 2009. Interview with V. Mtsweni, Mpumalanga Department of Local 
Government and Housing on June 30, 2009. 
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Lerato Park Interviews in Kimberley (Northern Cape) 
 
Barnes, L. 2009. Interview with Lennie Barnes, Senior Manager Planning and 
Research, DPLG on June 25, 2009. 
 
Booysen, G. 2009. Interview with Gratitude Booysen, Human Settlements and 
Traditional Affairs on June 25, 2009. 
 
Haasbroek, S. 2009. Interview with Sarel Haasbroek, Senior Manager Housing 
Development on June 25, 2009. 
 
Oliver, A.  2009. Interview with Andre Oliver, Project Coordinator ABSA and Bigen 
Africa on June 25, 2009. 
 
Suliman, S.  2009. Interview with Saligh Suliman, Manager Capacity Development 
DPLG on June 25, 2009. 
 
Mafikeng Interviews  (Northwest) 
 
Bidi, V. 2009. Interview with Vusi Bidi, Project Manager, Department of 
Developmental Local Government and Housing, Provincial Government Northwest 
on  June 17, 2009. 
 
Hart, W. 2009. Interview with Wessel Hart, Project Manager, Department of 
Developmental Local Government and Housing, Provincial Government Northwest 
on  June 17, 2009. 
 
Leshoe, P.  2009. Interview with Phenyo Leshoe. Project Manager, Department of 
Developmental Local Government and Housing, Provincial Government Northwest 
on  June 17, 2009. 
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Mokobane, P. 2009. Interview with Peter Mokobane, Project Manager, Department 
of Developmental Local Government and Housing, Provincial Government Northwest 
on  June 17, 2009. 
 
Mokoma, B. 2009. Interview with B Mokoma, Project Manager, Department of 
Developmental Local Government and Housing, Provincial Government Northwest 
on  June 17, 2009. 
 
Moremedi, L. 2009. Interview with Lesley Moremedi, Director Capacity-Building, 
Department of Developmental Local Government and Housing, Provincial 
Government Northwest on  June 17, 2009. 
 
Mount Moriah Interviews in Durban (KwaZulu Natal) 
 
Govender, R. 2009. Interview with Ravesh Govender, KZN Provincial Department of 
Housing on May 6, 2009. 
 
Milne, M. 2009. Interview with Martie Milne, Product Development , KZN Provincial 
Department of Housing on May 6, 2009. 
 
Oakes, W. 2009. Interview with Winston Oakes, KZN Department of Housing, on 
May 6, 2009. 
 
Sithole, B. 2009.  Interview  with Ben Sithole, KZN Department of Housing, on May 
6, 2009 
 
Olievenhoutbosch  Interviews in Tshwane  (Gauteng) 
 
Boschoff, A. 2010.  Interview with  Anton Boschoff from Bigen Africa on December 
2nd,  2010. 
 
Harrilal, M.  2010. Interview with  Mala Harrilal from the Tshwane Department of 
Housing on December 2,  2010. 
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Hlatshwayo, T. 2010.  Interview with Thokozani Hlatshwayo Gauteng Capacity-
Building Department on December 2, 2010. 
 
Komane, M. 2010. Interview with Mokgosi Komane from the Tshwane Department of 
Housing on December 2, 2010. 
 
Marima, M. 2010. Interview with Moira Marima, Director Housing Administration City 
of Tshwane on December 2, 2010.  
 
Mohale, P.  2010. Interview with Paulinah Mohale, a resident at Olievenhoutbosch, 
at 10219 Ext 36, Olievenhoutbosch, Centurion, on December 3, 2010. 
 
Molefe, M. 2010.  Interview with Magrett Molefe, a resident from Olievenhoutbosch, 
at Olievenhoutbosch, Centurion, on December 3, 2010. 
 
Moodley, G. 2010. Interview with Gary Moodley, a resident from Olievenhoutbosch 
on December 3, 2010. 
 
Potgietersrus Interviews in Mokopane (Limpopo) 
 
Makhubele, E. 2009. Interview with Evans Makhubele, Divisional Head Town 
Planning, Mogalakwena Municipality on March 18, 2009. 
 
Masekela M. 2009. Interview with Mohlago Masekela, Divisional Head Support 
Services, Mogalakwena Municipality on March 18, 2009. 
 
Mashotsa, M.  2009. Interview with M. Mashotsa, Deputy Manager Housing, 
Mogalakwena Municipality on March 18, 2009. 
 
Minty, M. 2009. Interview with Mike Minty, Sustainability Office, Standard Bank on  
March 18, 2009. 
 
Mothapo, W. 2009. Interview with Walter Mothapo, Limpopo Department of Local 
Government and Housing  on  March 18, 2009. 
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Nemadzilini, C. 2009. Interview with Cedric Nemadzilini, Limpopo Department of 
Local Government and Housing  on  March 18, 2009. 
 
Seroka, D. 2009. Interview with Digkola Seroka, General Manager Housing and 
Project Management Limpopo Department of Local Government and Housing  on  
March 18, 2009. 
 
Witsands Interviews in Atlantis (Western Cape) 
 
Coetzee, B.  2009. Interview with Barry Coetzee, Head of Utility Services, City of 
Cape Town on November 6, 2009. 
 
Guy, M.  2009. Interview with Mothusi Guy, Director of PEER Africa on May 25, 
2009. 
 
Hlwili, P. 2009. Interview with Patrick Hlwili, Chair of WHEBSO and Witsands 
resident on May 25,  2009. 
 
Saayman, R. 2009. Interview with Raymond Saayman, Capacity-Building, Provincial 
Government Western Cape on May 26, 2009.  
 
Zanemvula Interviews in Port Elizabeth (Eastern Cape) 
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